

Indonesia's Agrarian Movement: Anti-Capitalism at a Crossroads

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Introduction¹

The contemporary agrarian movement in Indonesia began in the last decade of the New Order regime (1966-1998). Several land disputes turned into violent clashes when farmers protested against low compensation and the heavy-handed methods used by state agents to expropriate lands for development projects (Afiff *et al.* 2005; Lucas and Warren 2003, 2000; Aditjondro 1998). Part of this wave of conflicts involved contests over rights to natural resources (Afiff and Lowe 2007; Warren 1998a, 1998b). In many cases, farmers' causes were endorsed by student groups and urban non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Although early protests were suppressed, they set the scene for a vigorous movement to emerge after Suharto resigned in 1998. Within a few years, the movement succeeded in pressuring the Parliament to pass a decision on agrarian reform and on the management of natural resources. Farmers' unions have also organized numerous protests against rice imports, trade agreements and international financial organizations.

After a decade of fast growth, the movement is now at a critical stage. Despite numerous protests and greater access to politicians under *Reformasi* (reformation period or post-1998 era), the agrarian movement has not generated sufficient political support among elites for its goal of land redistribution. The Parliament decision remains to be fleshed out in specific laws and regulations. The government has gradually restored the power of the

Indonesian Bureau of Logistics (*Badan Urusan Logistik*; BULOG), partly in response to popular protests, but rice imports keep arriving.² In 2003 Indonesia was the world's largest rice importer, much to the indignation of farmers' groups.

Activists from urban NGOs and their collaborating academics have produced most of the literature about the agrarian movement in Indonesia (e.g. Fauzi 2003; Wiradi 2000). While valuable, these accounts tend to reflect the view of a few groups rather than the entire movement; thus, for instance, radical groups are discussed but do not receive in-depth treatment. Besides the fact that urban NGOs are more accessible, the greater coverage given to them in the literature sometimes reflects analysts' interests in themes of greater interest to a Western audience such as environmental protection, civil society and democratic transition. In part because they are recent, anti-globalization discourses and activities have received less attention than longstanding land and environmental protests. There is similarly a bias in favor of ongoing activities centered on today's activists with insufficient attention to historical and structural factors.

Agrarian unrest is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia. The first decade after independence (1949) saw a spontaneous movement by landless farmers to squat on plantation lands. In the 1960s, the Communist Party of Indonesia (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*; PKI) led farmers in a violent campaign to claim lands that legally belonged to them according to the Basic Agrarian Law (*Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria*; UUPA) promulgated in 1960.³ Simmering conflicts led to massive violence during 1965-1966, when a coup brought General Suharto to power. In this event, the military coordinated a

campaign that killed or imprisoned hundreds of thousands of farmers belonging to communist groups.

What role does this history play in the current agrarian movement? Does the rise of today's movement owe only to developments in the 1980s, or do its genealogies go back further? This chapter builds on existing accounts but takes a step back to aim at two related goals. First, I hope to provide a fuller overview of the agrarian movement in Indonesia, especially its often overlooked anti-capitalist discourse. Second, through the study of movement discourses, I hope to offer a different perspective about the origins of the movement. Existing accounts have analyzed this movement within the context of an emergent civil society or democratizing trends (Uhlin 1995; Eldridge 1995; Aspinall 2004; Nomura 2007). They have paid insufficient attention to the ideological roots of this movement. As I argue below, there is a close affinity between the discourses of agrarian activists today and those of the broader anti-capitalist movement that dated back to colonial times.

Anti-capitalism is defined here both as a theme in the political discourse and as (originally) a counter-hegemonic movement that dates back to the colonial period. Anti-capitalism differs from anti-globalization: globalization is of recent use in Indonesia and is not consistently opposed by activists as capitalism is. After three decades of rapid capitalist development under Suharto, anti-capitalism remains surprisingly robust and relevant. I argue that this particular perspective illuminates many aspects of the current movement heretofore obscured.

Indonesia's Agrarian Movement's Shape and Scale

Since 1998, Indonesia has seen the births of hundreds of farmers' unions. The largest national network of farmers' unions is the Indonesian Federation of Farmers' Unions (*Federasi Serikat Petani Indonesia*; FSPI). Acting jointly with these unions are numerous local and national NGOs, the best known being perhaps the Consortium for Agrarian Reform (*Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria*; KPA) which was founded in the mid-1990s and now has about 200 member organizations. On environmental and natural resources issues, the largest NGO is the Indonesian Forum on Environment (*Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia*; WALHI), also founded very early, over 25 years ago (Di Gregorio 2006). Farmers have received sustained support from NGOs working on human rights and legal aid, especially during the early and difficult years when the political environment was repressive.

Most Indonesian NGOs are urban-based and enjoy extensive transnational links to Western organizations (Uhlin 1995: 167-84; Eldridge 1995, 2007). Most receive substantial funding from foreign donors. But the links go beyond the West. The Secretary General of FSPI, Henry Saragih, is also the Regional Coordinator of La Via Campesina (International Farmers' Movement), whose International Operative Secretariat is based in Jakarta (see also Kuhonta's chapter, this edition). Saragih sometimes leads protests around the world against the World Trade Organization (WTO) and was recently named by the British newspaper *The Guardian* as one of the 50 people who could change the

fate of the planet, together with figures like former U.S. Vice President Al Gore and German Prime Minister Angela Merkel.

Substantively, the agrarian movement in Indonesia involves struggles over three key issues, including land rights, natural resources and trade policy. The issue that has generated the most visible resistance, in the form of violence, and the most literature is no doubt land rights. There have been thousands of disputes involving farmers, state agencies, state plantations and private developers throughout Java alone (for cases in West Java, see Afiff *et al.* 2005). In 2007 alone, according to a count by the Indonesian Peasant Union (*Serikat Petani Indonesia*; SPI), there were 76 new or ongoing agrarian conflicts.

Even before the fall of Suharto, farmers had occupied thousands of hectares of plantation lands. In the eight years since 1998, according to the West Javanese branch of the Association of Plantation Corporations, 2,660 hectares or 12 per cent of total plantation areas in Garut district, West Java, were “plundered” by farmers (Fauzi 2007). A well-studied case involved Cieceng village in Garut district, where landless farmers occupied and divided among themselves 200 hectares of land leased to a state plantation company. This took place after villagers learned from farmers’ union leaders that the lease had expired in 1997 (Afiff *et al.* 2005: 19-20).⁴ In response, the state-owned plantation company trucked in hundreds of thugs to try to evict farmers, and the ensuing clash led to many houses and trucks burned. Nationwide, farmers’ movements to seize land have

triggered a counter-movement by affected parties: according to the SPI, nearly 200,000 hectares were seized from farmers and conflicts led to eight deaths in 2007.

Parallel to farmers' resistance in the shape of organized protests and spontaneous actions are NGOs' attempts to push for legislative changes. Because the Basic Agrarian Law UUPA of 1960 was never repealed but simply ignored under President Suharto, activists demand that it now be implemented. The agrarian movement was split over this issue. Some activists from urban-based NGOs, especially those in the KPA, were willing to work with bureaucrats and elected officials to gain support for agrarian reform even if the Communist-associated UUPA was to be put aside and replaced with new laws (Fauzi 1999: 272-6). Other activists, mostly leftist academics and leaders of farmers' unions under the FSPI, rejected any changes to the UUPA (Bey 2002). The efforts of the first camp resulted in the Parliament decision in 2001 (People's Consultative Assembly Decree No. IX/2001 or TAP MPR No. IX/2001) that promised agrarian reform but that failed to mention the UUPA. The second camp, which protested the decision on the day it was passed, viewed this legislation as serving only NGOs' interests, not those of farmers (Lucas and Warren 2003: 116-22). The differences in outlooks and strategies between the KPA and FSPI, the two leading groups in the movement, are sometimes portrayed as coming from their social bases: KPA's members are mostly urban NGOs whereas FSPI's are mostly farmers' unions (ibid.: 116-20). Yet both share many members, and KPA leaders have denied that the differences are significant (Fauzi and Bachriadi 2006: 11-3).

The struggle over natural resources overlaps that over land but involves primarily communities of outer islands who rely on both forest resources and (often swidden) agriculture. For this reason, the cause was sponsored first by NGOs working on environmental issues such as WALHI (Moniaga 2007). Essentially the struggle centers on claims based on customary rights to land or resource uses. Disputes over land and natural resources between indigenous communities and state agents go back to colonial times, but took shape as a national movement only in the 1990s with the help of NGOs which frame the issue as the rights of indigenous communities (“masyarakat adat”).

Since the concept of “indigenous communities” was first approved by the NGOs involved in 1993, there have been two national congresses in 1999 and 2003 that gathered representatives from numerous such communities to display solidarity, formulate vision, coordinate action and consolidate the movement (ibid.). The movement has achieved some success. In a dispute over a government plan to build a hydro-electric power station in the Lore Lindung area of Central Sulawesi, local protests and NGO pressure led to its cancellation (Sangaji 2007: 327-8). Since the mid-1990s, NGOs have assisted many communities to map the territories that their customary rights cover (Peluso 2003). These efforts have allowed these communities to challenge the state or its agents when there were disputes. An example is the dispute concerning the Lore Lindung National Park where a local community called Katu was allowed to use some land in the Park based on their arguments of indigenous rights (ibid. 328-30). Farmers’ protests under the banner of “indigenous rights” in Sosa, North Sumatra similarly forced a state plantation company to offer fairer compensation for their lands (Afiff and Lowe 2007: 85-8).

Similar to the UUPA issue that split agrarian reform activists into two camps, the “masyarakat adat” (indigenous communities) movement is controversial. The *adat* (tradition or custom) concept is criticized for being “overly idealistic and does not adequately reflect empirical realities”, and for assuming characteristics of *adat* groups to be static (Sangaji 2007: 321). It is often difficult for activists to find communities that are completely distinct from other groups. There is also considerable social stratification within each community, and guaranteeing *adat* rights does not ensure equality. In areas with large migrant populations, *adat*-based struggles often pit one community (“indigenous”) against another (settlers) (Li 2007: 356-9; also compare with Dressler, this edition). Finally, local elites have sought to manipulate the movement to their own political ends (ibid. 359-65). Violent communal conflicts among ethnic Dayaks, Malays and Madurese in Kalimantan were caused or exacerbated by urban Dayak elites who manipulated landless Dayak resentment to advance their political interests (van Klinken 2006; Davidson 2008).

Besides land and indigenous rights, protests against free trade are another major activity of farmers’ groups in Indonesia but have received less attention from analysts. Four kinds of activity can be discerned. First are actions to protest specific government decisions or legislations such as the import of rice or the 2007 Bill on Foreign Investment. Second are rallies to commemorate certain dates which represent nationalistic symbols such as the Day of National Awakening (January 28, 1908) and the Africa-Asia Conference in Bandung in 1955. These events are linked to activists’ demands for agrarian reform or

food sovereignty. Third, movement leaders organize conferences scheduled to occur at the same time as major events held by international organizations such as the FAO and the WTO, whether in Indonesia or abroad. The organizers and participants in these events do not seek access to those international organizations. Rather, these parallel conferences are to raise public concerns about issues important to farmers and to present alternatives to official policies. The events, especially the demonstrations, are also to display popular support for the causes embraced by protesters. Fourth and finally, some organizations are active abroad, participating in protests to strengthen international solidarity with the worldwide anti-globalization movement.

The FSPI has played a central role in most activities. In April 2005, it helped found the umbrella group *Gerakan Rakyat Lawan Nekolim* (People's Movement to Oppose Neo-colonialism and Neo-imperialism or *Gerak Lawan*).⁵ Other members of this group include WALHI, *Aliansi Buruh Mengugat* (Alliance of Critical Workers), *Koalisi Anti Utang* (Anti-Debt Coalition), *Front Perjuangan Pemuda Indonesia* (Youth Front for Struggle), *Lingkar Studi-Aksi untuk Demokrasi Indonesia* (Academic-Activist Circle for Democracy), *Komite Mahasiswa Anti-Imperialisme* (Student Committee against Imperialism), *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa LAKSI 31* (United Action for LAKSI 31), and *Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Indonesia* (Legal Aid and Human Rights Association). Not all NGOs and farmers' unions have joined *Gerak Lawan*. The KPA, which is active on land issues, has rarely participated in anti-trade activities.

To recap, the agrarian movement in Indonesia has experienced considerable growth and transformation since 1998. It is increasingly diversified, both in organization and in the issues of struggle. Existing accounts have focused mostly on land disputes and protests involving natural resources. Anti-trade activities are more recent and have not yet been analyzed. Missing from the literature are not only these activities, but also the discourses of the movement.⁶ What are the worldviews of activists? What concepts, images and arguments do they use in their struggles and different forms of resistance?

Agrarian Movement Discourses⁷

Discourses constitute a major part of any social movement. Consisting of words, arguments, images and symbols, discourses not only express movement visions, goals and strategies, but also serve to connect members and facilitate communication with others.

This section will analyze the anti-capitalist ideology that is deeply held and broadly shared among most agrarian activists in Indonesia. This ideology is expressed in their deep hostilities to capitalism and to the pillars of the global “capitalist system.” Targets of their harsh and frequent denunciations include global trade, foreign investment, capitalist countries and the international organizations dominated by them. Some activists have more nuanced views than others, but they all share basic assumptions about capitalism.

Activists invariably view capitalism as an unjust socio-economic system. Wiradi, an early advocate of agrarian reform and a senior advisor to the KPA, writes that the capitalist

mode of agrarian transformation historically involved the creation of large-scale agribusinesses that “swallowed almost all the small farmers” (Wiradi 2000: 64). The result was a process by which land control was concentrated in the hands of a few while small farmers were turned into workers or tenants (ibid: 29). In New Order Indonesia, this unjust process has triggered numerous land disputes (ibid: 89).

Noer Fauzi (n.d.), former director of the KPA, opposes the land administration project funded by Australia because he thinks farmers would not benefit from such a single land management system: “Having a certificate put [farmers] into the capitalist arena. But [they] will be weak participant[s], and could be worse off than before.” Fauzi predicts that (further) unequal land distribution would result. Fauzi’s belief in capitalism as unjustly favoring the strong is shared by Saragih of the FSPI who also criticizes the World Bank for promoting “market-assisted land reform.” Saragih believes that this kind of land reform would lead to the privatization of land and the creation of land markets. In these markets the rich who can pay for land would accumulate land (Netto 2006). Agribusinesses would become more powerful while farmers would have less access to land.

Activists also challenge the ideological and philosophical bases of “capitalism,” which is classical liberalism and neoliberalism. They associate these “-isms” with “colonialism,” “imperialism” and “individualism”, concepts carrying strong negative connotations in a country which was once colonized and whose culture is often touted for valuing family spirits and communal collaboration. Idham Samudra Bey who directs the Center for

National Democracy Studies writes that colonialism and imperialism were “born from the womb of classical liberalism which is based on an individualistic philosophy” (Bey 2002). Neoliberalism, he maintains, is based on the same philosophy and is thus only the continuation of classic liberalism. Anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism were the foundation of the UUPA and Bey was adamant that the law be implemented unchanged.

Being hostile to capitalism, many activists view the world in structural terms, as divided into the rich/advanced/industrialized countries [*negara industri maju*] and the poor/developing countries [*negara sedang berkembang*]. The advanced countries are targets not of emulation but of denunciation. They argue that there are many mechanisms through which developing countries and their people are exploited in a structurally asymmetric world. The first mechanism is through loans promoted or arranged by international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Indonesian activists often voice visceral hatred toward these organizations. As Dani, the speaker representing *Koalisi Anti Utang* (Anti-Debt Coalition), argued at a rally in front of Japanese and several Western embassies in Jakarta on September 5, 2006, “[through their loans] the World Bank and the IMF have committed crimes against humanity for the interests of the advanced countries” (*Federasi Serikat Petani Indonesia* 2006a). The loans benefited foreign investors at the expense of “the people’s welfare” (*Federasi Serikat Petani Indonesia* 2006b). Even though more than 150 out of 184 members of the World Bank are developing countries, 67 per cent of votes are controlled by 34 “advanced countries,” with the largest numbers of votes held by the U.S., Japan, France, England and Germany. These countries are thus held responsible for those “crimes.”

To agrarian movement activists, “free trade” can be another means of exploitation. Trade hurts farmers in importing countries because the advanced countries can produce goods at cheaper prices and often subsidize their producers. The “giant transnational companies” present in the country such as Monsanto (agrochemical), Freeport MacMoran (mining), Cargill (agriculture) and Charoen Pokphand (agriculture) are accused of “flooding the markets of poor and developing countries” with their “super-cheap commodities” that harm the small rice farmers (*Gerak Lawan* 2007).⁸ Rice imports are said to have turned Indonesian rice farmers into non-agricultural workers, migrants or the unemployed (*ibid.*). Finally, trade causes Indonesia to depend on the international market and lose her national sovereignty. Some activists stress that they do not advocate a complete ban on food trade, but the needs of families and local people must be given priority, and agriculture must be based on sustainable small-scale household production (Ikhwan 2007).

Due to activists’ animosity toward trade, the WTO has earned particularly vicious attacks from them. Calling this trade organization “the enemy of the Peasant,” the declaration of the FSPI-hosted Dili conference of La Via Campesina accused it of creating poverty and hunger while causing natural resources exploitation and environmental destruction worldwide (*Federasi Serikat Petani Indonesia* 2000). Other international organizations are not so bitterly opposed. The United Nations and its agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) are not targets of protest, even though Western nations in some sense also dominate these organizations. When the FAO organized the

International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD) in Brazil, March 7-10, 2006, the KPA and its two senior advisors, Sediono Tjondronegoro and Gunawan Wiradi, met with several government ministries to prepare a joint delegation (Consortium for Agrarian Reform 2006). At the same time, the KPA joined the FSPI and others in a joint position paper to demand, among other items, that the Indonesian government boycott the ICARRD if this conference approved the program of land registration sponsored by the World Bank (*Federasi Serikat Petani Indonesia* 2006c).

Activists have protested rice imports and unfair trade practices not only on the streets but also at the conceptual level. Food Sovereignty [*kedaulatan pangan*] is a concept aggressively promoted by the movement to counter the FAO's concept of "food security." The FSPI/La Via Campesina organized a conference on Food Sovereignty in Jakarta in May 2006 that gathered representatives of farmers' organizations from Japan, Korea, the U.S., India, and other Asian nations. Food sovereignty includes at least three demands. First, as organizers explained, "FAO's 'food security' concept only relates to food availability, access to food and food safety. It does not take into consideration where the food comes from and how it is produced... This is why we are promoting food sovereignty that also encompasses issues such as land distribution, farmers' control over water, seed biodiversity and technology" (*Federasi Serikat Petani Indonesia* 2006d). Activists thus see the hunger problem as involving more than just making sure enough food is on the table of every family. Hunger is not solved unless farmers have full control over inputs (seeds, water, land and technology) and the production process.

Second, there is more value and meaning assigned to food than simply something to eat, and the problem to activists goes beyond hunger. Muhammad Nuruddin, the Secretary General of the Indonesian Alliance of Farmers (*Aliansi Petani Indonesia*; API) elaborates, “Food is a basic need of human kind. Because of this, the food problem relates to the individual, household and society as a basic human right. Food sovereignty is the right of a nation and monopoly of its availability is a form of colonization through food and clearly violates Human Rights” (Nuruddin 2007). To activists like Nuruddin, control over food production and consumption is a basic human and national right—hence the term “sovereignty”.

Third, because the Jakarta conference on Food Sovereignty focused on the Asia-Pacific region where rice is commonly the main staple food, activists gave special attention to rice. It was declared, “Rice is not only a commodity; it is life, culture and dignity!” This slogan suggests that the problem perceived by activists is not just hunger, human rights and national sovereignty, but also moral and cultural preservation—at least as far as rice is concerned. Free trade in rice or food threatens not only food availability but also the very foundation of societies in Pacific Asia.

Investment is another mechanism by which advanced countries exploit developing countries. It is through their investment that transnational companies are “colonizing,” [*jajah*] “sucking” [*hisap*] and “absorbing” [*serap*] Indonesia (*Federasi Serikat Petani Indonesia* 2007a). Statements made at various events commonly recite a litany of

damages foreign investment causes to Indonesia. For example, one statement at the protest against the draft Bill for Foreign Investment read, “Foreign investment makes the people poorer and more marginalized. Women are even more marginalized and lose access and control over natural resources. [Foreign investment causes] imbalances in the production and distribution of necessities for the people’s livelihood. Eventually this will cause disasters such as agrarian conflicts and violations of human rights as is happening in Indonesia now” (ibid.). Some acknowledge that Indonesia may still need foreign capital for the time being, but call for the protection of “people’s rights” [*hak-hak rakyat*] (Wiradi 2000: 178).

With their hostilities toward capitalism, trade and foreign investment, it is only natural that activists feel apprehensive about globalization. Wiradi (2000: 177-9) defines globalization as essentially the movement of international capitalism. He argues that agribusinesses are simply part of this movement. These companies represent “efforts to acquire the use and benefits of land in developing countries for the interests of owners of international capital through the help [*nebeng*] of the governments of advanced countries” (ibid.). While globalization generates economic growth, it also creates economic and social inequalities and increases the dependency of developing countries on the advanced nations. Wiradi thus sees globalization as a threat [*ancam*], not an opportunity, for developing countries, and agrees with the well-known Indonesian agronomist Mubyarto that Indonesia must be “extra-vigilant” about globalization.

Usep Setiawan, Deputy Secretary General of the KPA, goes into details on the negative consequences of globalization. First, the process makes farmers become “objects driven in the interests of capital.” Second, there is no substantial protection for farmers to maintain stability and security. Third, subsidies for farmers are discontinued, which makes it difficult for governments to help them. Fourth, imported products “crush the competitiveness of Indonesian farmers’ products.” And fifth, agriculture only serves the elites while accelerating urbanization and proletarianization (Setiawan n.d.). The bottom line of Setiawan and others’ argument is the same: globalization is believed to cause the destruction of (small-scale) agriculture and the “proletarianization” of farmers.

An irony exists in some activists’ attitude toward the state. While farmers are said to suffer tremendously under Suharto’s repressive developmental state, many activists still trust the state in providing protection to farmers. An often heard criticism of globalization is that this process weakens states in developing countries. Although these activists must be well aware of how corrupt BULOG was under Suharto, they defend the agency vigorously in the face of IMF and World Bank’s pressure on the Indonesian government to make BULOG a state-owned corporation rather than a state agency. The discrepancy among activists in their attitudes toward the state is a main cause of the disagreement over TAP MPR No. IX/2001. The UUPA entrusts the state with the control of all land, and this clause is a main reason many activists in the KPA want this law to be revised (Fauzi 1999: 275-6). With their memories of Suharto still fresh, these activists

emphasized that the control of land must rest with the people, not the state. This is also perhaps why the KPA has not rallied to defend BULOG as the FSPI does.

Activists sometimes draw their inspiration from Latin America. *Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas* (ALBA), the Latin American alternative trade alliance in opposition to American domination, is viewed as an attractive idea (Ikhwan 2007). This organization was founded in 2004 by Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro. Although most Indonesian activists admire those Latin American figures, they have different ideas about foreign models. Henry Saragih once expressed his pride that the Bandung Conference in 1955 had inspired Latin American populist leaders such as Hugo Chavez (Venezuela) and Evo Morales (Bolivia) (*Federasi Serikat Petani Indonesia* 2007b). He believed that it was right for Indonesians in turn, to be inspired and to learn from those leaders, but they ought to develop their own solutions based on their own country's history. Noer Fauzi shares the same belief. Asked whether there is any possibility for Indonesia to develop a situation similar to Venezuela, where the military supports a "progressive government" (under Hugo Chavez), Fauzi responded that Indonesians could learn from, but should not consider those Latin American models as ideals to emulate (Fauzi 2007). Instead, Fauzi argued that the model for Indonesia to learn from is the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)'s programs such as the "Go Down" campaign to create stronger links between activists and farmers through educational activities (Fauzi and Bachriadi 2006).⁹

Rejecting neoliberalism, activists advocate many alternatives, ranging from a "People's economy" [*ekonomi kerakyatan*], to an "economy complying with *Pancasila* principles"

[*ekonomi Pancasila*],¹⁰ to “neo-populist” agrarian reform. Wiradi proposes neo-populism as an alternative to capitalist and socialist approaches. This approach aims for an agrarian transformation that preserves small-scale farmers rather than moving them out of agriculture to make way for large-scale agribusinesses. La Via Campesina’s Conference on Food Sovereignty produces a list of demands grouped under four areas: land, water and seeds; rice production systems; post-harvest activities and processing; and trade. The first includes calls for land to the tiller and communal or public ownership of water and seeds. In the second, activists condemn the Green Revolution and advocate organic and natural farming. In the third and fourth areas, it is demanded that processing and local trade must be managed by small family units. The government is asked to abolish all export subsidies while giving subsidies to small farmers who produce for domestic needs. Domestic production should be regulated to prevent surpluses and rice imports be banned.

Explanations for Indonesia’s Agrarian Movement

There have been few efforts to explain the rise of the contemporary agrarian movement in Indonesia. Analysts have highlighted five sets of explanatory factors, including farmers’ grievances; expanding political opportunities; the dissemination of progressive ideas; leadership and organization; and changes in civil society under Suharto.

Grievances

Analyses of particular cases, sometimes by activists themselves, often focus on farmers’ grievances (Stanley 1994; Warren 1998a, 1998b; Lucas 1997, 1998; Fauzi 2005). Rapid

economic growth under Suharto dispossessed numerous farming communities of millions of hectares which were expropriated, often with little compensation and through intimidation, for plantations or other development projects. This was the direct cause of farmers' grievances and the majority of land disputes under Suharto. Many open-resistance land protests occurred under the military regime, and farmers in these cases risked arrests and deaths when they acted. Grievances were clearly behind the land reclaiming movement which peaked within a few years of the collapse of the New Order regime. In some cases grievances were inherited: the farmers who seized land from Suharto's family ranch in Tapos after he resigned were children of farmers whose lands were taken to create the ranch decades ago (Bachriadi and Lucas 2001).

Yet grievances cannot explain many phenomena and events. While grievances were widespread under Suharto, they did not cause as many open conflicts as they do now. In addition, college students from urban middle class families who worked for NGOs and joined farmers in many protests should have had no particular reasons to hate the military regime. It has been argued that these activists used, for example, environmental issues as a cause to fight for greater political freedom (Warren 1998a: 230, citing G. Aditjondro). The massive demonstrations on Jakarta's streets in the last few years against the WTO do not stem from any specific grievances either.

Political opportunities

Besides grievances, an expanding political opportunity structure since 1998 is the most obvious cause for the surge of agrarian protests (Fauzi and Bachriadi 2006: 14). The

collapse of the New Order regime immediately removed people's fear of repression, as can be observed in the acts of those farmers who seized Suharto's family ranch within days of his resignation. At the same time, subsequent free elections opened up space for political entrepreneurs and groups to organize (Di Gregorio 2006: 18-19). Decentralization now offers farmers' groups new forms of resistance and new ways of influencing politics, in particular by having their leaders elected to local offices (Fauzi and Bachriadi 2006: 14).

The structure of political opportunity for domestic activists was influenced not only by domestic political change but also by a major shift in the "global political climate" (Uhlin 1995: 167-8). As the Cold War declined in the late 1980s, Western allies of the Suharto regime became more forthcoming in their criticisms of its poor human rights record. These criticisms hurt the legitimacy of the government while emboldening domestic activists. But political opportunities are insufficient because they would come and go if activists and farmers did not seize them regardless of all the risks involved.

Dissemination of progressive ideas

A third explanation for the agrarian movement is the dissemination of democratic ideas in Indonesia since the 1980s. Activists fighting for agrarian justice found to be useful ideas such as the rule of law, human rights, indigenous rights, democracy and environment. These ideas allowed them to frame their demands in ways not associable with communism so as to avoid repression. These ideas enabled them to join a community of activists elsewhere in Asia (especially the Philippines and South Korea), Latin America

and Europe. Western ideas also came with the Western model of NGOs and with international support for these organizations. NGOs such as the Legal Aid Society and the Indonesian Environmental Forum (WALHI) indeed played decisive roles since the beginning of the movement.

But ideas do not come only from the West; democratic activists in fact have learned from and adopted ideas from cases of authoritarian collapse around the world: Iran in 1979, the Philippines in 1986, South Korea in 1987, and Eastern Europe in 1989 (Uhlin 1995: 185-236). Ideas explain the rise of urban activism but do not account for protests by illiterate farmers who are motivated mostly by a simple sense of justice. The dissemination of elite ideas about human rights and democracy is a lengthy process and is not useful for explaining the growth pattern of the movement. In addition, foreign ideas, however relevant, need cultural interpreters to resonate with Indonesians.

Movement's leadership and organization

Thus the fourth explanation for the agrarian movement stresses factors of leadership and organization. Intellectuals interpret and elaborate Western ideas to affirm their applicability in Indonesian cultural and social contexts (Uhlin 1995: 145-50). An example of a cultural entrepreneur is Abdurrahman Wahid, a Muslim democrat who would later become President (from 1999 to 2001). In responding to criticisms of (Western) democratic ideas, Wahid pointed out Islamic and Hindu traditions that corresponded to basic principles of (Western) democracy such as the rule of law and basic human rights. Other activists reached back into history to demonstrate that authoritarian culture was not

culturally rooted in Indonesia any more than democracy. In the same vein, environmental issues were reframed in terms of basic human rights and became politicized during the 1990s thanks to the efforts of democratic activists (Komura 2007: 506).

Cultural entrepreneurs must operate alongside political ones. While the former expand the cultural resources deployable in conflicts, the latter seize political opportunities and turn them into political events. An example is the training organized in the 1980s by some advocacy NGOs for student activist groups in issues of development, authoritarianism and methods of people mobilization. This training has been credited for keeping the movement alive at a difficult time (Fauzi and Bachriadi 2006: 8). Often seizing or expanding opportunities involves appropriate tactics and strategies (Di Gregorio 2006). The campaign for agrarian reform led by the KPA during 1999-2001 is an example. Initially the KPA sought to create dialogues with major political parties to no avail (Rosser *et al.* 2005: 65-6). In 2001, the KPA changed its strategy and tried to “socialize” the issue of land reform among Parliament members while maintaining popular pressure through street protests. They also expanded opportunities by finding allies among sympathetic officials and by exploiting differences among ruling elites and state agencies (Afiff *et al.* 2005: 7-8). Despite the fall of Suharto, entrenched interests in the political system remained strong and the Parliament decision on agrarian reform would not have been passed without the hard work by activists.

Changes in Civil Society under Suharto

The four explanatory factors discussed thus far rely on social movement approaches and concepts. These factors are not mutually exclusive but in fact complimentary. Grievances motivate farmers' protests, which are connected regionally and nationally by networks of urban NGOs. These NGO activists are influenced by progressive ideas while helping transform them into cultural resources. *Reformasi* expands the structure of political opportunities, and activists as well as disaffected farmers seize them to demand social justice. Yet social movement concepts do not present the whole picture. By focusing on actors, their activities and their organizations, these accounts lose sight of larger forces at work.

Under military rule from 1966 to 1998, Indonesia's society witnessed considerable changes.¹¹ The authoritarian state's success in establishing its dominance profoundly restructured civil society. This can be observed by comparing land conflicts in the early 1960s to those in the 1990s. Land conflicts in the previous period were within village society, occurring between local landlords and farmers who were members of the PKI (Huizer 1982). In contrast, those in the 1990s pitted entire rural communities against the state or its capitalist agents (Aspinall 2004: 80). By the early 1990s, horizontal conflicts had been replaced by vertical ones. Social activism and agrarian protests were mostly directed against the state, not to wage a social revolution as in the 1960s, but to win policy concessions and to limit state arbitrary power.

Under the New Order state, radical and polarizing organizations such as the PKI were suppressed but moderate social organizations such as the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and

newly created NGOs were tolerated (Aspinall 2004: 75). The combination of repression and toleration helped promote moderate organizations and ideas while weeding out radical ones. The moderation of civil society was carried forward further by a small but vocal minority of a growing urban middle class that emerged thanks to rapid economic development under Suharto. This new group sought to connect their interests in greater political freedom to the dispossessed farmers' desire for social justice (ibid.: 76). Civil society in this context became the vehicle for the dissemination of moderate middle-class values among lower classes.

Existing explanations have offered valuable insights into the causes of the contemporary agrarian movement in Indonesia. However, there has been a lack of attention to and failure to anticipate the growth of radical groups in the movement in recent years. Despite the opening up of access to numerous policymaking channels, groups such as the FSPI still reject taking advantage of such access points.¹² Their rhetoric borders on revolution against the global capitalist system which they view as fundamentally unjust. We have also seen the puzzling return of old anticolonial and Cold War ideological themes. Although there are obvious links between the agrarian movement and the PKI of the 1960s, the roots of the movement may extend further back to colonial times. Finally, if the central motif of conflict underlying today's agrarian movement is between the state and society as Aspinall (2004) argues, it is difficult to explain why many activists desire a strong state that can "protect the people". The FSPI in its protests against rice imports demands the return of this state in the form of a powerful BULOG that can maintain adequate supplies and affordable prices for all. Below I argue that a better understanding

of this movement can be gained by examining the evolution of anti-capitalism in Indonesia's modern history.

The Discursive Approach: The Agrarian Movement's Ideological Genealogies

What is the history of anti-capitalism in Indonesia? How did it survive thirty years of rapid capitalist development under Suharto? In this section I sketch the evolution of anti-capitalism in Indonesia from its birth in the 1920s, its consolidation during the revolution, its embattled position in the 1960s, and its decline under the New Order regime. This review of the historical development of anti-capitalism, I argue, offers many insights into the current agrarian movement.

Anti-capitalism in Indonesia was the child from the marriage of Marxism and nationalism.¹³ Dutch socialists and labor organizers introduced Marxist ideas to the Dutch Indies in the mid-1910s with the creation of the Indies Social Democratic Association (Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereniging; ISDV), which was the forerunner of the PKI. This was a decade before a nationalist group first used the term "Indonesia" in the name of their party. Until then (1925), the term used by all political organizations to indicate today's Indonesia was still the Dutch Indies [*Hindia Belanda*].¹⁴ In other words, "Indonesian" political activists in the second decade of the 20th century had known Marx before they started calling themselves "Indonesians."

By 1918, the Marxist discourse, including themes of class struggle, anti-capitalism and world revolution, was popular not only among radical circles or political organizations

but also in the moderate press outside Java (McVey 1965: 178). The dominance of Marxism in the indigenous intellectual discourse at the time was due in part to the rapid ascendancy of the ISDV/PKI. Within a few years of its birth, communist members successfully persuaded the Islamic League (*Sarekat Islam*; SI) to let them join. Red SI members soon formed a significant faction in both the top leadership and local branches of SI (ibid., 84-6, 171-7). SI was founded originally in 1912 as an organization of Muslim traders; in its first constitution, the promotion of commerce, Muslim brotherhood, progress, and religion were declared to be the goals of the organization (Noer 1972: 111). A decade later, this was no longer the case. Under pressure from communist members, SI leader H. O. S. Cokroaminoto came out forcefully in 1917 to declare his opposition to capitalism (Shiraishi 1990: 104).

It was this particular environment that nationalist ideas faced when they arrived in the Indies in the 1920s. Hostilities to nationalism came from both communists and Muslims. To communists, nationalism was a 19th-century European phenomenon and not a real issue in the Dutch Indies (McVey 1965: 178). The PKI struggled for a world proletarian revolution, not for national independence (ibid. 63-5). Nationalism also met resistance from conservative Muslim leaders who believed in Pan-Islamism. In their view, “the nation” [*bangsa*] and “homeland” [*tanah air*] were simply the masks of chauvinism that led countries to fight each other (Sukarno 1964: 109-14). Islam, as all major world religions, did not recognize national boundaries.

Whether out of conviction or mere convenience, young nationalists such as Sukarno and Hatta sought to justify nationalism with socialist concepts. Marxist terms peppered their discourses. Most nationalists of this period, whether secular and Muslim, claimed they were socialists. Sukarno did not simply preach nationalism, which he believed by itself was inadequate. Instead he called for “*sosio-nasionalisme*” (ibid., 187-91) In Sutan Sjahrir’s vision, an independent Indonesia would be where ownership of the means of production was socialized (Sjahrir 1947: 63-6).

Yet the emerging nationalist discourse was no longer Marxist, only strongly colored by it. Visceral anti-capitalist sentiments replaced class analyses. Rather than promising a utopian classless society or calling for a violent class struggle as communists did, nationalists preferred spending their energies on attacking capitalism, i.e. its exploitative and oppressive character (Sukarno 1964: 181-5; Hatta 1976, v. 1: 356-70). In an influential thesis that sought to unify nationalist, Marxist and Islamic groups, Sukarno pointed out that these groups should unite because they all shared the same enemy, i.e. Western capitalism (Sukarno 1964: 1-23). Like Marxists, nationalists naturally opposed Western capitalism which colonized Indonesia. For Muslims, Westerners were infidels and Islamic teaching of wealth sharing and injunction against usury meant capitalism must be opposed. Anti-capitalism, not class struggle, was promoted as the common denominator of all three ideologies.

If the PKI had *not* been crushed in their failed rebellion during 1926-1927, or if Marxism had arrived concurrently with nationalism as in China or Vietnam, anti-capitalism may

not have been born. Once born, anti-capitalism became the dominant force thanks to the ability of anti-capitalist formulations in accommodating different ideologies from Islam to communism, to the central roles its progenitors (Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir and others) played in the fight against the Dutch for national independence, and to the politics of accommodation during state formation (Vu 2007).

In the last months of the Japanese occupation, the Japanese government allowed Indonesian nationalists to form a committee to prepare for independence. As chair of this committee, Sukarno proposed five main principles [*Pancasila*] for the future Indonesian state (Yamin 1959, v. 1: 61-81). These five included “nationalism” (a unified nation), “internationalism” (respect for the family of nations and for humanity), “democracy” (based on representation and consultation for consensus), “social justice” (prosperity and welfare for all) and “belief in God” (God of any religions). The first two combined would be nationalism without chauvinism; the third and fourth principles combined would be representative democracy without capitalist exploitation. Anti-capitalism was thus codified as a foundation of the Indonesian state. Anti-capitalism was also embedded in several clauses in the 1945 constitution. For example, Article 33 called for government ownership and supervision of all important industries, presumably to protect “the people” from capitalist exploitation.

The coalition led by Sukarno battled many challenges from both left and right. During the struggle against the Dutch (1945-1949), nationalist leaders had to pledge to respect the interests of Western capital in Indonesia in return for diplomatic recognition. Tan

Malaka, a former PKI leader, almost toppled the Sjahrir cabinet in early 1946 by challenging the compromise it made with Western capitalists.¹⁵ When the Cold War started, Musso, who led the PKI for a few months before being killed in a failed coup in late 1948, demanded that the government join the Soviet Union to fight imperialism. To both Malaka and Musso, Sukarno-style anti-capitalism was unsatisfactory for not making real commitments to class struggle and world revolution.

Still, anti-capitalism was powerful throughout the 1950s. “Big foreign capital” [*modal besar asing*] was a favorite target of denunciation for leftist politicians in parliamentary debates at the time. Advocates for the nationalization of foreign assets launched frequent and virulent attacks on foreign capitalists, condemned as “shrewd and dangerous” “criminals” who “would be tortured in hell under the law of Allah” (Vu 2008: 297-300). Anti-capitalist discourses directly challenged policies to develop a capitalist economy by several post-independence cabinets led by men such as Mohammad Natsir and Wilopo. These conservative Muslim leaders promoted rapid economic growth, welcomed Western investors back, banned labor strikes, and sought close relationships with Western powers. Yet these pro-capital governments soon collapsed in the face of harsh criticisms against capitalism and imperialism. Indonesia nationalized most foreign assets in the late 1950s. These assets were placed under state management to make sure their profits go to “the people”. Anti-capitalist sentiments and the political coalitions that promoted them succeeded in pushing for the promulgation of UUPA in 1960 and other progressive agrarian reform measures.

The mid-1960s witnessed the rapid rise of the PKI and the radicalization of Indonesian politics. The removal of conservative leaders and technocrats such as Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Sumitro Djohadikusumo from the political stage contributed to this trend.¹⁶ As Indonesia challenged Western powers in the West Irian conflict and in the campaign against Malaysia, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism brought Sukarno closer to the PKI (Mortimer 1974: 176-86). These themes had been parts of “anti-capitalism” too, but with the PKI now in the van, the discourse had latent communist tones. In late 1963, PKI leaders openly urged farmers to take unilateral action to implement the UUPA, pushing one step further for class struggle (Huizer 1980: 64-127). The PKI stressed the need for working classes to fight “feudalism” and “imperialism” besides capitalism (Mortimer 1974: 314).

After the PKI-inspired coup in October 1965 was crushed by a countercoup by Suharto, the military regime under Suharto destroyed the PKI, overthrew Sukarno, banned communism and made “development” [*pembangunan*] the new national creed. Yet this regime never had the strength, confidence or capacity to completely erase the legacies of anti-capitalism. In part this was because the generals themselves had come of age during the struggle for independence and considered anti-capitalism part of their political belief.¹⁷ Internationally, while Suharto welcomed Western investment and formed close relationships with Western powers, he never supported the American war in Vietnam as South Korea or Thailand did. Domestically, he kept the 1945 Constitution and forcibly imposed *Pancasila*, Sukarno’s brainchild, as the official state doctrine. All social

organizations were now forced to accept *Pancasila* as their ideology while students and bureaucrats were made to study *Pancasila* in specialized indoctrination programs.

Carol Warren (1990: 191-2) reported that she frequently encountered what she called “vocabularies of modern critical discourse” during her fieldwork in rural Bali, suggesting the resilience of anti-capitalism under Suharto. Words such as “kesadaran” (consciousness of collective goods), “pemerataan” (equalization of economic benefits), “sosial” (socially-committed) and “piodal” (feudal), commonly found in the discourses of the 1950s and 1960s, did not disappear under Suharto as one would expect. Others have noted that the New Order regime, especially in its first two decades, never called itself capitalist or even free enterprise; government propaganda in the 1980s still described its strategy of development as taking the middle path between capitalism and socialism (Lane 1982: 123 cited in Warren 1990: 192). The UUPA was sidelined but never abrogated. To be sure, anti-capitalism had passed its heyday and now had to compete with neoliberalism. Yet the return of radical agrarian politics in the last few years that is posing a challenge to dominant capitalist interests indicates that the struggle is far from over.

The above review is sketchy but I hope the main elements are clear. Parallels between the discourse of the agrarian movement and the pre-New Order anti-capitalist discourse are hard to miss. There are visceral anti-capitalist sentiments mixed with anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism—today as were decades ago. Striking continuities can be discerned in activists’ deep mistrust of foreign trade, foreign capital and international financial

organizations. There is an obsession with rice as a symbol of social justice, a phenomenon that emerged during the struggle against the Dutch during 1945-1949 (Vu 2003). Finally, Sukarno's nationalist symbols such as "Nekolim" and the National Day of Awakening are now revived to serve new purposes.

One may argue that today's anti-capitalism is only a reaction to capitalist development under Suharto, not owing to what preceded him. It is not possible to say exactly whether contemporary groups really find in the Constitution, the UUPA and other Sukarno's formulations what they want, or they merely seek to manipulate them. Still, it is difficult to dismiss such a rich past that left so many legacies in today's discourses and that was never completely subdued under Suharto.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to offer an overview of the agrarian movement in Indonesia today. I have discussed three components of the movement: the struggles over land, natural resources, and trade policy related to agriculture. Geographically, the struggles over land and trade policy are most intense on Java, where most Indonesians live. This movement began in the 1980s and has grown rapidly since the end of the New Order. It is composed of spontaneous actions by farmers at the grassroots level on the one hand, and organized efforts by urban NGOs with extensive transnational links on the other. At the discursive level, leaders of the movement are profoundly influenced by the anti-capitalist ideology rooted in Indonesia's struggle for independence from colonial rule. The

moderate and the radical in the movement may disagree over strategies but they all share fundamental assumptions about capitalism as an exploitative and inhumane system.

Existing explanations for the evolution of the Indonesian agrarian movement have focused on factors such as grievances, political opportunities, ideas, leadership and organization, and changing state-society relations. By analyzing movement discourses, I hope to add a different perspective. In particular, I tried to show how the current movement has ideological genealogies in the longstanding anti-capitalist movement in Indonesia. While existing accounts see some continuity between the current movement and the PKI's agrarian mobilization efforts in the 1960s, I showed that one can go back much further to the birth of anti-capitalism in the 1920s.

The agrarian movement in Indonesia adds an interesting twist to the thoughts of Polanyi while Gramsci gives us some clue about the direction it may be heading to. First, activists not only agree with Polanyi that land cannot be made a commodity; they go further to demand that rice should be similarly treated. This demand suggests that the meanings of labor, land and food may differ in different societies and change over time.

Second, Gramsci's concept of "passive revolutions" may be more appropriate in Indonesia than his better-known concept of "hegemony".¹⁸ As anti-capitalism has evolved in Indonesia since the 1920s, no hegemonic ideas or classes have emerged. There was a revolution (1945-1949) and a counter-revolution (1965-1966), but the winners emerging from these critical events never succeeded in establishing complete hegemony.

Gramsci offers two possible scenarios for countries like Indonesia that have experienced only “passive revolutions” but not class hegemony (Cox 2005: 38-9). One is caesarism or the emergence of a strong man, and the other is *trasformismo* or the rise of a broad movement that incorporates lower classes into a corporatist system. In Gramsci’s Italy *trasformismo* would develop into fascism. Both scenarios are not too far-fetched in the Indonesian context. Sukarno and Suharto arguably represented some combination of caesarism and *trasformismo* at different points. Sukarno’s Guided Democracy began as caesarism but increasingly had characteristics of *trasformismo* with his *Nasakom* government.¹⁹ Suharto’s New Order was clearly caesarism.

Gramsci’s pessimistic predictions for countries with passive revolutions seem relevant to conditions in Indonesia today. If Aspinall (2004) is right in arguing that moderation trends contributed to the rise of civil society in Indonesia in the 1980s, recent trends in Indonesian and global politics suggests that polarization has returned. From a class perspective, the power transition in 1998 did not overthrow the ruling elites; it only removed Suharto and rearranged the relative positions of various elite factions (Hadiz 2003). The regime remains essentially capitalist and is arguably more integrated into the international capitalist system than before. Social inequalities appear to have increased under *Reformasi*, in part because of the impact of the 1997 financial crisis (Breman and Wiradi 2002). With a weak central authority and corrupt local governments, one wonders how effective programs of poverty reduction can be implemented (Aspinall and Fealy 2003). Under a weak state, conflicts within society—whether of ethnic, religious or class nature—seem to have increased (Bertrand 2004; Sidel 2006). Internationally, despite

(premature) declarations about “the end of history”, the early years of the 21st century witness the consolidation of an anti-globalization movement that barely emerged a decade ago. Although one may dismiss Hugo Chavez and Osama bin Laden as pompous or criminal figures with little credibility, they do attract numerous admirers, including many Indonesian radicals, simply for standing up to the U.S. There is thus some possibility that Indonesian civil society and now-moderate agrarian movement may turn uncivil again if polarizing trends continue in the future.

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² BULOG is a state-owned company that manages food distribution and controls specific prices.

³ "Originally, the law had two key purposes: first, to create a single land law applicable to all citizens of Indonesia, thereby replacing the legal pluralism of colonial law in which racial categories and regional status determined which legal systems (customary, commercial, civil) would be applied in adjudicating or resolving land disputes. The second purpose was to require land reform through the imposition of ceilings on private landholdings, both owned and controlled" (Afiff *et al.*, 2005: 3).

⁴ The plantation originally was leased to an agricultural enterprise during the colonial era but was taken over by a state plantation company at independence. Villagers' ownership rights to this land are not well established in this case, as in most other cases.

⁵ *Nekolim* is an acronym created in the 1960s by Sukarno.

⁶ A few exceptions (some dated) are Warren (1998a, 1998b), Peluso (2003), and Afiff and Lowe (2007). Uhlin (1995) offers a good (but dated) analysis of the early discourses of democratic activists, of whom agrarian activists were a part.

⁷ Due to space constraint, I do not aim to provide a comprehensive analysis of its discourses here. In addition, the subject of analysis is limited to elite discourses, not those of the masses. Geographically, the analysis is focused mostly on Java, where anti-capitalism has been most intense and where most Indonesians live.

⁸ Charoen Pokphand is actually a Thai company which is one of the largest multinational investors in Asia.

⁹ The PKI's "Go Down" campaign was borrowed from Chinese Communists' "Xiafang" campaign (Mortimer 1974: 278-81).

¹⁰ *Ekonomi Pancasila* was first developed by Mubyarto. For various expositions of current thinking on *Pancasila* economy, see the online journal *Ekonomi Rakyat* www.ekonomirakyat.org.

¹¹ This section relies on Aspinall (2004).

¹² FSPI seems to have an Islamic equivalent in the Hizbut Tarir, a radical Muslim group, which has rejected to participate in democratic activities such as elections.

¹³ The discussion of Indonesia's anti-capitalism through the 1950s is abridged from Vu (2008: ch. 9).

¹⁴ This group was PI or *Perhimpunan Indonesia* (Ingleson 1975: 7). PKI was founded in 1920—five years earlier than PI—but its name then was *Perserikatan Komunis di India* (McVey 1965: 46).

¹⁵ Sutan Sjahrir was Indonesia's Prime Minister from late 1945 to mid-1947 who led the difficult negotiations with the Netherlands for Indonesia's independence.

¹⁶ These leaders joined the failed regional rebellions in 1957 and were later either imprisoned or sent into exile.

¹⁷ Suharto, for example, was born in 1920 and was only 25 in 1945.

¹⁸ Cox (2005: 39) argues that this notion of "passive revolutions" is particularly appropriate in industrializing Third World countries.

¹⁹ *Nasakom* stands for nationalism, religion and communism.