Course Description

The aim of the course is to understand the thought of key figures in the history of moral philosophy, including existentialism and feminism. We will focus on key ideas in the moral systems developed by Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, J.S. Mill, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone De Beauvoir. Our reading and writing will engage primary sources and students will be encouraged to provide contemporary examples and applications of the main ideas. The course will begin with what morality and conscience are, in general ways that are independent of particular moral systems. The course with conclude with Feminist Ethics.

Course work will consist of reading, class participation and discussion, and three 3-page papers and one final 5-page paper.

The course can be applied to the Arts & Letters group requirement and the University multicultural requirement (as an “AC” or American Culture course).

Course Objectives

- Acquire a familiarity with well recognized ideas in philosophical ethics and moral philosophy.
- Critically engage these ideas and representative scholars by using philosophical methods of analysis, as well as contemporary cultural examples.
- Contrast and compare these philosophical treatments of ethics and morality.

Learning Outcomes

- Knowledge acquired of an enduring philosophical tradition and some of its paradigm examples and subjects.
- Exposition, Interpretation, and Criticism of perspectives and analyses from major authors.
- Ability to understand some of the complexities of moral reasoning.
- Development of students understanding of their own moral systems and moral reasoning.
Requirements (See also Appendix, A-D)

**GRADE Components** 3 three-four page papers (45%); One five-page paper (25%) Informed class participation (you have done the readings before class) and attendance at lecture and discussion (30%) ***Please see paper assignments at end of syllabus + 5 pts extra credit assignment, TBA.


**Absences** - You are allowed 2 free absences from lecture, which do not require a written excuse or advance notification, unless you are missing a due date for a paper, and, 2 free absences from section. Absences over these amounts require documentation to be excused. Otherwise, each unexcused absence from lecture or section will detract 2 points from your final grade.

**Class atmosphere** - mutual respect, no electronic devices (unless related to a disability or course reading), community building in the classroom.

**Late papers** will be accepted without penalty if you have the kind of documentation that would count as an excused absence. Otherwise, late papers will lose a third of a letter grade for each class day they are handed in late. E.g. if a paper due on Tuesday (which they all are) is handed in on Thursday, a B grade will be lowered to a B-. If it is handed in the following Tuesday, to a C+ and on the next Thursday, to a C. The maximum penalty for late papers is a deduction of 2 letter grades. If you fall behind, please stay in touch with your GTF about plans to catch up.

**Required Reading** – All required readings are posted on Canvas

Reading will consist of about 20 pp. for each class. For longer works, selections of texts will be assigned.

**COURSE SCHEDULE**

1. CONSCIENCE

   **WEEK 1.**
   
   T- What is morality? What is conscience?
   
   Read in class and discuss: Thomas Nagel, From *What Does it All Mean?,* 1987, Chapter 7, “Right and Wrong”
   

   **WEEK 2**
   
Reference - Alberto Giubilini, “Conscience,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and paper prompt for paper #1: DUE T, Week 3, before 12PM – 15% of grade. Write an essay analyzing the importance or unimportance of conscience for morality. 900-1200 words, 12pt font, double spaced. Use endnotes or author, date, pp. numbers within your paper for references to the readings. References to the readings are required.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

WEEK 3

T and R - Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Books I, II, III. - selections TBA

WEEK 4

T and R - Immanuel Kant, “Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals” - - selections TBA

WEEK 5

T and R - John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism - selections TBA

WEEK 6

Transition

T and R - Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals - selections TBA

Summary and Paper Prompt for Paper # 2, DUE T, Week 6, before 12PM – THIS PAPER IS WORTH 25% OF YOUR GRADE. Write an essay analyzing how Nietzsche destabilizes or supports each of the moral systems proposed by Aristotle, Kant, and Mill. (choose destabilization or support for each system). 1500 words, 12pt font, double spaced. Use endnotes or author, date, pp. numbers within your paper for references to the readings. References to the readings are required.

EXISTENTIALISM

WEEK 7

T - Jean-Paul Sartre, “Existentialism is a Humanism”

R - Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity

Summary and Paper Prompt for Paper #3, 25% of final grade. Due T Week 8, before 12PM. Return to your insights about conscience at the beginning of the class. What would Sartre and Beauvoir say about that? 900-1200 words, 12pt font, double spaced. Use endnotes or author, date, pp. numbers within your paper for references to the readings. References to the readings are required.
FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY OF RACE

WEEK 8

Essays from, Claudia Card, ed., Feminist Ethics, 1991


R – Lynne Mc Fall, “What’s Wrong With Bitterness?”

WEEK 9

T – Marilyn Friedman, “The Social Self and the Partiality Debates”

R – Sarah Lucia Hoagland, “Some Thoughts about Caring”

Week 10 – TBA 5%, oral reports in class. Students will have an opportunity to earn extra credit for presenting a contemporary issue in the news in detail, and in terms of how it relates to any material covered in the course.

Paper #3, Due T of Week 11, before 8 PM.

T Week 11 Paper Prompt, Referring to the assigned authors, explain what feminism adds to or takes away from traditional moral theory. 15% of final grade, words, 12pt font, double spaced. Use endnotes or author, date, pp. numbers within your paper for references to the readings. References to the readings are required.

APPENDIX, A-D

A. Disability

Philosophy Department faculty and instructors do their best to comply with Disability Services policy and instructions, as follows. Please see no. 4 in particular.

At a minimum, Instructors have the responsibility to ensure Full access for students with disabilities by responding to a student's need or request for accommodations as outlined below.

1. If a student presents you with a notification letter from DS:

2. You have the responsibility to cooperate with DS in providing authorized accommodations in a reasonable and timely manner. The specific accommodation determines the amount of involvement required. Refer to the section below entitled "Examples of Shared Responsibility" for a description of your involvement in providing the most common accommodations.

3. If a student does not present you with a notification letter from DS:
4. If a student requests an accommodation without having presented you with the notification letter from DS, please refer the student to DS. If the student is already on file with DS, a request form just needs to be filled out. If the student is new to DS, the process to review documentation and meet with the student may take some time. If the disability is obvious and the accommodation appears appropriate, you may need to provide the accommodation while awaiting official notification. If you are unsure, please call DS for assistance.

5. If a student discloses a disability to you:
6. Ask to see the notification letter from DS. This letter describes the accommodations that the institution is legally mandated to provide. During an office hour or at another convenient time, discuss the letter and the accommodations with the student. Students MUST present a notification letter from DS to receive testing accommodations. If the student does not have a letter, please refer the student to DS. Appropriate accommodations will be determined after reviewing documentation of the disability and the student will be issued the notification letter.

7. If you have a question about the appropriateness of an accommodation:
8. Questions about the appropriateness of certain accommodations should be directed to the Director of DS.

9. If a disability is suspected:
10. Share your concerns with the student regarding his or her performance. If the concern seems disability-related, ask if he or she has ever received assistance for a disability. If it seems appropriate, refer the student to DS for further discussion and guidance. It is the student's decision whether or not to self-identify to DS; however, to receive accommodations, disclosure to DS with proper documentation is required.

B. GRADES : U of O Philosophy Department Policy
What kind of paper deserves an “A,” “B,” etc.? The following reflects the general standards of the Philosophy Department at the University of Oregon.

\[ \begin{align*}
A &= \text{excellent. No mistakes, well-written, and distinctive in some way or other.} \\
B &= \text{good. No significant mistakes, well-written, but not distinctive in any way.} \\
C &= \text{OK. Some errors, but a basic grasp of the material.} \\
D &= \text{poor. Several errors. A tenuous grasp of the material.} \\
F &= \text{failing. Problematic on all fronts indicating either no real grasp of the material or a complete lack of effort.}
\end{align*} \]

Please note: what counts as “excellent” or “OK,” for example, depends in part upon the nature and level of the class in question.

Discussion forms an integral part of the course, and your performance will be graded on the basis of the quantity and quality of your participation. You should arrive prepared to discuss the material and course assignments.

C. Academic Honesty
The stiffest punishments possible will be sought for those who plagiarize, fabricate, or cheat. (The usual punishment is an “F” for the course.) The following offers examples of academic dishonesty.

Plagiarism Plagiarism is the inclusion of someone else's product, words, ideas, or data as one's own work. When a student submits work for credit that includes the product, words, ideas, or data of others, the source must be acknowledged by the use of complete, accurate, and specific references, such as footnotes. Expectations may vary slightly among disciplines. By placing one's name on work submitted for credit, the student certifies the originality of all work not otherwise identified by appropriate acknowledgements. On written assignments, if verbatim statements are included, the statements must be enclosed by quotation marks or set off from regular text as indented extracts.

A student will avoid being charged with plagiarism if there is an acknowledgement of indebtedness. Indebtedness must be acknowledged whenever:
1. one quotes another person's actual words or replicates all or part of another's product;
2. one uses another person's ideas, opinions, work, data, or theories, even if they are completely paraphrased in one's own words;
3. one borrows facts, statistics, or other illustrative materials--unless the information is common knowledge.
Unauthorized collaboration with others on papers or projects can inadvertently lead to a charge of plagiarism. If in doubt, consult the instructor or seek assistance from the staff of Academic Learning Services (68 PLC, 346-3226). In addition, it is plagiarism to submit as your own any academic exercise (for example, written work, printing, computer program, art or design work, musical composition, and choreography) prepared totally or in part by another. Plagiarism also includes submitting work in which portions were substantially produced by someone acting as a tutor or editor.

**Fabrication**

Fabrication is the intentional use of information that the author has invented when he or she states or implies otherwise, or the falsification of research or other findings with the intent to deceive.

Examples include, but are not limited to:
1. citing information not taken from the source indicated;
2. listing sources in a reference not used in the academic exercise;
3. inventing data or source information for research or other academic exercises.

**Cheating**

Cheating is an act of deception by which a student misrepresents or misleadingly demonstrates that he or she has mastered information on an academic exercise that he or she has not mastered, including the giving or receiving of unauthorized help in an academic exercise.

Examples include, but are not limited to:
1. copying from another student's paper, computer program, project, product, or performance;
2. collaborating without authority or allowing another student to copy one's work in a test situation;
3. resubmitting substantially the same work that was produced for another assignment without the knowledge and permission of the instructor;
4. writing a paper for someone else or permitting someone else to take a test for you.

**D. HOW TO WRITE GOOD PHILOSOPHY PAPERS**

Note: When you get your papers back, there will be comments. The letters in parentheses indicate what aspect of your writing might need improvement and you may see them the second or third time this aspect still needs work.

1. **CLARITY** (CL) Since this is a philosophy paper, make sure that you define your terms and give reasons for claims. All of your ideas should be explicitly stated and not left to the reader to infer. One difference between philosophy and literature is that philosophers spell everything out, while creative writers depend on the imagination of the reader.

2. **PRECISION** (P) Try not to make vague claims or general statements about the ideas in the readings. Be accurate in reporting the views of others and exact in stating your own.

3. **ORGANIZATION** (O) Organize the ideas in the paper into a few coherent paragraphs. Summarize the main claims of your paper in 2 or 3 sentences that you write after you write the paper, but put at the very beginning of the paper. This is an appropriate introductory paragraph for a philosophy paper, not a filler or a fluffy beginning.

3. **WRITING MECHANICS** (WR) The mechanics include spelling, punctuation, syntax and complete sentence structure. Make sure that you already have these down or consult a source if you don’t. Highly recommended is Strunk and White’s *The Elements of Style*. This is available on line at www.bartleby.com/141/

4. **ANALYSIS** (A) Analyze claims. This means breaking your ideas down into their simpler components, and defining them. Do not start with or rely on dictionary definitions, but use your own words and cite the dictionary only if necessary. Dictionary definitions report usage, whereas a philosophical definition may be critical of current usage or find it vague. Examine the logical consequences of your claims and the claims of others.
5. **CITATION** (C) Cite the required readings this way in your text: (author’s last name, page no.) As well, provide a list of citations at the end of the paper. It is important to do this to show you have done the required reading and are not just recycling notes from class or discussion group lectures. If you do use material from lecture, please make sure to cite that as well.

6. **QUOTATIONS** (Q) Quotations should be used to illustrate a claim that you are making about an author. They are not a substitute for explaining the author’s thought in your own words. A good strategy is to state the author’s ideas in your own words first and then “prove” your interpretation with a short quote.

7. **DIRECT** (D) Be direct. Make sure that you give a direct and focused answer to the question for the paper. This is the most important requirement for papers to reach the B and A range.

**READING FOR FIRST DAY OF CLASS**

Chapter 7, from Thomas Nagel, *What Does It All Mean?*

**Right and Wrong**

Suppose you work in a library, checking people's books as they leave, and a friend asks you to let him smuggle out a hard-to-find reference work that he wants to own. You might hesitate to agree for various reasons. You might be afraid that he'll be caught, and that both you and he will then get into trouble. You might want the book to stay in the library so that you can consult it yourself. But you may also think that what he proposes is wrong—that he shouldn't do it and you shouldn't help him. If you think that, what does it mean, and what, if anything, makes it true?

To say it's wrong is not just to say it's against the rules. There can be bad rules which prohibit what isn't wrong—like a law against criticizing the government. A rule can also be bad because it requires something that is wrong—like a law that requires racial segregation in hotels and restaurants. The ideas of wrong and right are different from the ideas of what is and is not against the rules. Otherwise they couldn't be used in the evaluation of rules as well as of actions.

If you think it would be wrong to help your friend steal the book, then you will feel uncomfortable about doing it: in some way you won't want to do it, even if you are also reluctant to refuse help to a friend. Where does the desire not to do it come from; what is its motive, the reason behind it?

There are various ways in which something can be wrong, but in this case, if you had to explain it, you'd probably say that it would be unfair to other users of the library who may be just as interested in the book as your friend is, but who consult it in the reference room, where anyone who needs it can find it. You may also feel that to let him take it would betray your employers, who are paying you precisely to keep this sort of thing from happening.

These thoughts have to do with effects on others—not necessarily effects on their feelings, since they may never find out about it, but some kind of damage nevertheless. In general, the
thought that something is wrong depends on its impact not just on the person who does it but on other people. They wouldn't like it, and they'd object if they found out.

But suppose you try to explain all this to your friend, and he says, "I know the head librarian wouldn't like it if he found out, and probably some of the other users of the library would be unhappy to find the book gone, but who cares? I want the book; why should I care about them?" The argument that it would be wrong is supposed to give him a reason not to do it. But if someone just doesn't care about other people, what reason does he have to refrain from doing any of the things usually thought to be wrong, if he can get away with it: what reason does he have not to kill, steal, lie, or hurt others? If he can get what he wants by doing such things, why shouldn't he? And if there's no reason why he shouldn't, in what sense is it wrong?

Of course most people do care about others to some extent. But if someone doesn't care, most of us wouldn't conclude that he's exempt from morality. A person who kills someone just to steal his wallet, without caring about the victim, is not automatically excused. The fact that he doesn't care doesn't make it all right: He should care. But why should he care?

There have been many attempts to answer this question. One type of answer tries to identify something else that the person already cares about, and then connect morality to it.

For example, some people believe that even if you can get away with awful crimes on this earth, and are not punished by the law or your fellow men, such acts are forbidden by God, who will punish you after death (and reward you if you didn't do wrong when you were tempted to). So even when it seems to be in your interest to do such a thing, it really isn't. Some people have even believed that if there is no God to back up moral requirements with the threat of punishment and the promise of reward, morality is an illusion: "If God does not exist, everything is permitted."

This is a rather crude version of the religious foundation for morality. A more appealing version might be that the motive for obeying God's commands is not fear but love. He loves you, and you should love Him, and should wish to obey His commands in order not to offend Him. But however we interpret the religious motivation, there are three objections to this type of answer. First, plenty of people who don't believe in God still make judgments of right and wrong, and think no one should kill another for his wallet even if he can be sure to get away with it. Second, if God exists, and forbids what's wrong, that still isn't what makes it wrong. Murder is wrong in itself, and that's why God forbids it (if He does.) God couldn't make just any old thing wrong—like putting on your left sock before your right—simply by prohibiting it. If God would punish you for doing that it would be inadvisable to do it, but it wouldn't be wrong. Third, fear of punishment and hope of reward, and even love of God, seem not to be the right motives for morality. If you think it's wrong to kill, cheat, or steal, you should want to avoid doing such things because they are bad things to do to the victims, not just because you fear the consequences for yourself, or because you don't want to offend your Creator.

This third objection also applies to other explanations of the force of morality which appeal to the interests of the person who must act. For example, it may be said that you should
treat others with consideration so that they'll do the same for you. This may be sound advice, but it is valid only so far as you think what you do will affect how others treat you. It's not a reason for doing the right thing if others won't find out about it, or against doing the wrong thing if you can get away with it (like being a hit and run driver).

There is no substitute for a direct concern for other people as the basis of morality. But morality is supposed to apply to everyone: and can we assume that everyone has such a concern for others? Obviously not: some people are very selfish, and even those who are not selfish may care only about the people they know, and not about everyone. So where will we find a reason that everyone has not to hurt other people, even those they don't know?

Well, there's one general argument against hurting other people which can be given to anybody who understands English (or any other language), and which seems to show that he has some reason to care about others, even if in the end his selfish motives are so strong that he persists in treating other people badly anyway. It's an argument that I'm sure you've heard, and it goes like this: "How would you like it if someone did that to you?"

It's not easy to explain how this argument is supposed to work. Suppose you're about to steal someone else's umbrella as you leave a restaurant in a rainstorm, and a bystander says, "How would you like it if someone did that to you?" Why is it supposed to make you hesitate, or feel guilty?

Obviously the direct answer to the question is supposed to be, "I wouldn't like it at all!" But what's the next step? Suppose you were to say, "I wouldn't like it if someone did that to me. But luckily no one is doing it to me. I'm doing it to someone else, and I don't mind that at all!"

This answer misses the point of the question. When you are asked how you would like it if someone did that to you, you are supposed to think about all the feelings you would have if someone stole your umbrella. And that includes more than just "not liking it"-as you wouldn't "like it" if you stubbed your toe on a rock. If someone stole your umbrella you'd resent it. You'd have feelings about the umbrella thief, not just about the loss of the umbrella. You'd think, "Where does he get off, taking my umbrella that I bought with my hard-earned money and that I had the foresight to bring after reading the weather report? Why didn't he bring his own umbrella?" and so forth.

When our own interests are threatened by the inconsiderate behavior of others, most of us find it easy to appreciate that those others have a reason to be more considerate. When you are hurt, you probably feel that other people should care about it: you don't think it's no concern of theirs, and that they have no reason to avoid hurting you. That is the feeling that the "How would you like it?" argument is supposed to arouse.

Because if you admit that you would resent it if someone else did to you what you are now doing to him, you are admitting that you think he would have a reason not to do it to you. And if you admit that, you have to consider what that reason is. It couldn't be just that it's you that he's hurting, of all the people in the world. There's no special reason for him not to steal
your umbrella, as opposed to anyone else's. There's nothing so special about you. Whatever
the reason is, it's a reason he would have against hurting anyone else in the same way. And
it's a reason anyone else would have too, in a similar situation, against hurting you or anyone
else. But if it's a reason anyone would have not to hurt anyone else in this way, then it's a
reason you have not to hurt someone else in this way (since anyone means everyone).
Therefore it's a reason not to steal the other person's umbrella now.

This is a matter of simple consistency. Once you admit that another person would have a rea-
son not to harm you in similar circumstances, and once you admit that the reason he would
have is very general and doesn't apply only to you, or to him, then to be consistent you have
to admit that the same reason applies to you now. You shouldn't steal the umbrella, and you
ought to feel guilty if you do.

Someone could escape from this argument if, when he was asked, "How would you like it if
someone did that to you?" he answered, "I wouldn't resent it at all. I wouldn't like it if
someone stole my umbrella in a rainstorm, but I wouldn't think there was any reason for him
to consider my feelings about it." But how many people could honestly give that answer? I
think most people, unless they're crazy, would think that their own interests and harms
matter, not only to themselves, but in a way that gives other people a reason to care about
them too. We all think that when we suffer it is not just bad for us, but bad, period.

The basis of morality is a belief that good and harm to particular people (or animals) is good
or bad not just from their point of view, but from a more general point of view, which every
thinking person can understand. That means that each person has a reason to consider not
only his own interests but the interests of others in deciding what to do. And it isn't enough if
he is considerate only of some others—his family and friends, those he specially cares about.
Of course he will care more about certain people, and also about himself. But he has some
reason to consider the effect of what he does on the good or harm of everyone. If he's like
most of us, that is what he thinks others should do with regard to him, even if they aren't
friends of his.

Even if this is right, it is only a bare outline of the source of morality. It doesn't tell us in
detail how we should consider the interests of others, or how we should weigh them against
the special interest we all have in ourselves and the particular people close to us. It doesn't
even tell us how much we should care about people in other countries in comparison with our
fellow citizens. There are many disagreements among those who accept morality in general,
about what in particular is right and what is wrong.

For instance: should you care about every other person as much as you care about your- self?
Should you in other words love your neighbor as yourself (even if he isn't your neighbor)?
Should you ask yourself, every time you go to a movie, whether the cost of the ticket could
pro- vide more happiness if you gave it to someone else, or donated the money to famine
relief?

Very few people are so unselfish. And if some- one were that impartial between himself and
others, he would probably also feel that he should be just as impartial among other people.
That would rule out caring more about his friends and relatives than he does about strangers. He might have special feelings about certain people who are close to him, but complete impartiality would mean that he won't favor them—if for example he has to choose between helping a friend or a stranger to avoid suffering, or between taking his children to a movie and donating the money to famine relief.

This degree of impartiality seems too much to ask of most people: someone who had it would be a kind of terrifying saint. But it's an important question in moral thought, how much impartiality we should try for. You are a particular person, but you are also able to recognize that you're just one person among many others, and no more important than they are, when looked at from outside. How much should that point of view influence you? You do matter somewhat from outside—otherwise you wouldn't think other people had any reason to care about what they did to you. But you don't matter as much from the outside as you matter to yourself, from the inside—since from the outside you don't matter anymore than anybody else.

Not only is it unclear how impartial we should be; it's unclear what would make an answer to this question the right one. Is there a single correct way for everyone to strike the balance between what he cares about personally and what matters impartially? Or will the answer vary from person to person depending on the strength of their different motives?

This brings us to another big issue: Are right and wrong the same for everyone?

Morality is often thought to be universal. If something is wrong, it's supposed to be wrong for everybody; for instance if it's wrong to kill someone because you want to steal his wallet, then it's wrong whether you care about him or not. But if something's being wrong is supposed to be a reason against doing it, and if your reasons for doing things depend on your motives and people's motives can vary greatly, then it looks as though there won't be a single right and wrong for everybody. There won't be a single right and wrong, because if people's basic motives differ, there won't be one basic standard of behavior that everyone has a reason to follow.

There are three ways of dealing with this problem, none of them very satisfactory.

First, we could say that the same things are right and wrong for everybody, but that not everyone has a reason to do what's right and avoid what's wrong: only people with the right sort of "moral" motives—particularly a concern for others—have any reason to do what's right, for its own sake. This makes morality universal, but at the cost of draining it of its force. It's not clear what it amounts to say that it would be wrong for someone to commit murder, but he has no reason not to do it.

Second, we could say that everyone has a reason to do what's right and avoid what's wrong, but that these reasons don't depend on people's actual motives. Rather they are reasons to change our motives if they aren't the right ones. This connects morality with reasons for action, but leaves it unclear what these universal reasons are which do not depend on motives that everyone actually has. What does it mean to say that a murderer had a reason not to do it, even though none of his actual motives or desires gave him such a reason?
Third, we could say that morality is not universal, and that what a person is morally required
to do goes only as far as what he has a certain kind of reason to do, where the reason depends
on how much he actually cares about other people in general. If he has strong moral motives,
they will yield strong reasons and strong moral requirements. If his moral motives are weak
or nonexistent, the moral requirements on him will likewise be weak or nonexistent. This
may seem psychologically realistic, but it goes against the idea that the same moral rules
apply to all of us, and not only to good people.

The question whether moral requirements are universal comes up not only when we compare
the motives of different individuals, but also when we compare the moral standards that are
accepted in different societies and at different times. Many things that you probably think are
wrong have been accepted as morally correct by large groups of people in the past: slavery,
servitude, human sacrifice, racial segregation, denial of religious and political freedom,
dereditary caste systems. And probably some things you now think are right will be thought
wrong by future societies. Is it reasonable to believe that there is some single truth about all
this, even though we can't be sure what it is? Or is it more reasonable to believe that right and
wrong are relative to a particular time and place and social background?

There is one way in which right and wrong are obviously relative to circumstances. It is
usually right to return a knife you have borrowed to its owner if he asks for it back. But if he
has gone crazy in the meantime, and wants the knife to murder someone with, then you
shouldn't return it. This isn't the kind of relativity I am talking about, because it doesn't mean
morality is relative at the basic level. It means only that the same basic moral principles will
require different actions in different circumstances.

The deeper kind of relativity, which some people believe in, would mean that the most basic
standards of right and wrong-like when it is and is not all right to kill, or what sacrifices
you're required to make for others-depend entirely on what standards are generally accepted
in the society in which you live.

This I find very hard to believe, mainly because it always seems possible to criticize the
accepted standards of your own society and say that they are morally mistaken. But if you do
that, you must be appealing to some more objective standard, an idea of what is really right
and wrong, as opposed to what most people think. It is hard to say what this is, but it is an
idea most of us understand, unless we are slavish followers of what the community says.

There are many philosophical problems about the content of morality-how a moral concern
or respect for others should express itself; whether we should help them get what they want
or mainly refrain from harming and hindering them; how impartial we should be, and in what
ways. I have left most of these questions aside because my concern here is with the
foundation of morality in general-how universal and objective it is.

I should answer one possible objection to the whole idea of morality. You've probably heard
it said that the only reason anybody ever does anything is that it makes him feel good, or that
not doing it will make him feel bad. If we are really motivated only by our own comfort, it is
hopeless for morality to try to appeal to a concern for others. On this view, even apparently
moral conduct in which one person seems to sacrifice his own interests for the sake of others is really motivated by his concern for himself: he wants to avoid the guilt he'll feel if he doesn't do the "right" thing, or to experience the warm glow of self-congratulation he'll get if he does. But those who don't have these feelings have no motive to be "moral."

Now it's true that when people do what they think they ought to do, they often feel good about it: similarly if they do what they think is wrong, they often feel bad. But that doesn't mean that these feelings are their motives for acting. In many cases the feelings result from motives which also produce the action. You wouldn't feel good about doing the right thing unless you thought there was some other reason to do it, besides the fact that it would make you feel good. And you wouldn't feel guilty about doing the wrong thing unless you thought that there was some other reason not to do it, besides the fact that it made you feel guilty: something which made it right to feel guilty. At least that's how things should be. It's true that some people feel irrational guilt about things they don't have any independent reason to think are wrong- but that's not the way morality is supposed to work.

In a sense, people do what they want to do. But their reasons and motives for wanting to do things vary enormously. I may "want" to give someone my wallet only because he has a gun pointed at my head and threatens to kill me if I don't. And I may want to jump into an icy river to save a drowning stranger not because it will make me feel good, but because I recognize that his life is important, just as mine is, and I recognize that I have a reason to save his life just as he would have a reason to save mine if our positions were reversed.

Moral argument tries to appeal to a capacity for impartial motivation which is supposed to be present in all of us. Unfortunately it may be deeply buried, and in some cases it may not be present at all. In any case it has to compete with powerful selfish motives, and other personal motives that may not be so selfish, in its bid for control of our behavior. The difficulty of justifying morality is not that there is only one human motive, but that there are so many.