Top Descartes & Locke, Winter 2015, NZack

Course: 25958 PHIL 433/25959 PHIL 533
College: Arts & Sciences  Department: Philosophy

Days  Time  Location  Date Range
TR  12:00pm – 1:50pm  Villard  Jan 05, 2015 – Mar 15, 2015

Office hrs.  nzack@uoregon.edu

Description: Descartes is usually considered the leading early modern rationalist, Locke, the leading early modern empiricist. Each is foundational for subsequent philosophical methodologies. The aim of the course is to consider Descartes’ and Locke’s metaphysics and epistemology, both separately and comparatively. We will also consider the predecessors and successors of D and L, and relate their concerns to contemporary issues. (Assignments for this supplementary material will be built into the syllabus and emphasized in your written assignments, with the material available on BB.)

Course Objectives
- Acquire a familiarity with early modern philosophical perspectives on the ideas of personal identity and the nature of human knowledge.
- Contrast and compare Descartes and Locke in method and conclusions.
- Critically engage with strengths and weaknesses of rationalism and empiricism, both in the historical context of the authors and at present.
- Develop an understanding of how Cartesian rationalism and Lockean empiricism endure as philosophical influences.

LEARNING OUTCOMES

✓ Knowledge acquired of a distinctive philosophical subject and its key figures.
✓ Exposition, Interpretation, and Criticism of the ideas of specific thinkers.
✓ Ability to contrast and compare different intellectual perspectives.

SYLLABUS

REQUIRED TEXTS: THESE EDITED TEXTS ARE USED BY MOST DESCARTES AND LOCKE SPECIALISTS. BUT OTHER EDITIONS ARE ALRIGHT IF YOU CAN SYNCHRONIZE SECTIONS.

DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS, OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES, AND SEARCH FOR TRUTH IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF DESCARTES, TRANS. JOHN COTTINGHAM, ROBERT STOOTOFF, AND DUGARD MURDOCK, CAMBRIDGE, 1984-94, VOL. II.


Supplementary Readings (all posted on BB)

Aristotle, De Anima
D. Dennett on Demasio, Descartes' Error.
Descartes, Passions of the Soul
J. Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government, Chap. 5.

Note: Please be prepared to read about 30 pages as assigned, before each class, and to participate in discussion based on the readings.

Grades: 433: Participation – 30%; 3 three-page papers @ 15% each-45%; 4-5 page final paper-25%
533- participation – 30%, 3 five-page papers @ 15% each-45%; final 6-7 page paper-25%

Note: 1 inch margins on papers, double-spaced, 12 pt. font.
Participation = Informed discussion based on readings required for that day.
Send all papers as email doc. attachments to nzack@uoregon.edu


Schedule

Week I, Introduction: How Descartes and Locke viewed their projects and methods Tue and Thurs -

Thurs. Locke, ESSAY, Book I, Chaps I and II.

Descartes

Week II, TU. and Thurs. Descartes, Meditations (very fast read through for the first time) and “Letter to Father Dinet”
WEEK III Tuesday> Paper #1 due. 433 On the issue of how to go about discerning or discovering philosophical truth, with specific textual reference to the readings, explain how Descartes does it, how Locke does it, and the differences between them.

533 On the issue of how to go about discerning or discovering philosophical truth, with specific textual reference to the readings, explain how Descartes does it, how Locke does it, and the differences between them. Contrast both of these methods with a third method of your own preference (either that you prefer or that you just choose (for instance) or both).

TUES - Aristotle, De Anima
Thursday – Passions of the Soul

Week IV
Tues and Thurs, Descartes, “Objections and Author’s replies, from One-Seven---to be assigned based on earlier interests developed. These assignments will bring us back into the Meditations.

Week V
Tues – Objections and Replies, cont’d
Thurs. Summary of Descartes in terms of The Mind-Body Problem and Dennett on Demasio, Descartes’ Error.

Week VI, Tuesday> paper # 2, 433. Find three objections voiced against Descartes’ system (restate the objections in your own words), which in your opinion Descartes is unable to answer. The objections can come from Aristotle, or Descartes’ critics, but use no more than one from each source. Is Descartes’ system untenable because of these objections?

533 Find three objections voiced against Descartes’ system (restate the objections in your own words), which in your opinion Descartes is unable to answer. The objections can come from Aristotle, or Descartes’ critics, but use no more than one from each source. Is Descartes’ system untenable because of these objections? Show how the results of each objection are related to the results of the other objections, i.e., answer the question with a coherent essay, beginning with your own interpretation.

LOCKE

Week VI, Locke, Essay.
TU. Book I. OF INNATE NOTIONS review of chap. I and II, new reading, Book I, chap. III and IV
TH. Book II, OF IDEAS chaps. I-IX

Week VII, Locke, Essay, Book II.
TU. chaps X-XV.
TH. XX, Pleasure and Pain

**Week VIII**  *Essay, Book II.*

**TU.** Book II, chap. XXVII, On Identity

**TH.** Rovanne, “Sense and Reference.”

**Week IX, Tuesday**  *Paper # 3 due: 433 and 533.* Explain Locke’s theory of Free Will in relation to Pleasure and Pain. Assess whether he has an accurate view of human nature in your answer.

**TU.** Locke, *Second Treatise on Civil Government,* Chapter V.

**TH.** Zack, “Locke’s Identity Meaning of Ownership

**Week X**

**TU.** Discussion of part b) of their final papers by 533 students

**TH.** REVIEW, WRAPUP, general questions about final paper.

**Week XI**

**Tuesday:** Final paper due at 12 PM, March 18, 2015, to be handed in at Philosophy Dept. Office in 338 PLC

**433.** Explain how Locke’s theory of Identity is related both to his empiricism and to his political philosophy and compare it with Descartes’ idea of the mind.

**533** Contrast Locke’s theory of identity with both (a) Descartes’ theory of mind and (b) some other theory of identity or theory of mind, and c) argue for the truth of one of them.

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**APPENDIX, I. A-D.**

**A. Disability**

Philosophy Department faculty and instructors do their best to comply with Disability Services policy and instructions, as follows. Please see no. 4 in particular.

At a minimum, Instructors have the resposibility to ensure Full access for students with disabilities by responding to a student's need or request for accommodations as outlined beloTh.

**If a student presents you with a notification letter from DS:**

1. You have the responsibility to cooperate with DS in providing authorized accommodations in a reasonable and timely manner. The specific accommodation determines the amount of involvement required. Refer to the section below entitled “Examples of Shared Responsibility” for a description of your involvement in providing the most common accommodations.

2. **If a student does not present you with a notification letter from DS:**

3. If a student requests an accommodation without having presented you with the notification letter from DS, please refer the student to DS. If the student is already on file with DS, a request form just needs to be filled out. If the student is new to DS, the process to review documentation and meet with the student may take some time. If the disability is obvious and the accommodation appears appropriate,
you may need to provide the accommodation while awaiting official notification. If you are unsure, please call DS for assistance.

4. **If a student discloses a disability to you:**

5. Ask to see the notification letter from DS. This letter describes the accommodations that the institution is legally mandated to provide. During an office hour or at another convenient time, discuss the letter and the accommodations with the student. Students MUST present a notification letter from DS to receive testing accommodations. If the student does not have a letter, please refer the student to DS. Appropriate accommodations will be determined after reviewing documentation of the disability and the student will be issued the notification letter.

6. **If you have a question about the appropriateness of an accommodation:**

7. Questions about the appropriateness of certain accommodations should be directed to the Director of DS.

8. **If a disability is suspected:**

9. Share your concerns with the student regarding his or her performance. If the concern seems disability-related, ask if he or she has ever received assistance for a disability. If it seems appropriate, refer the student to DS for further discussion and guidance. It is the student's decision whether or not to self-identify to DS; however, to receive accommodations, disclosure to DS with proper documentation is required.

**B. GRADES : U of O Philosophy Department Policy**

What kind of paper deserves an “A,” “B,” etc.? The following reflects the general standards of the Philosophy Department at the University of Oregon.

- **A** = excellent. No mistakes, well-written, and distinctive in some way or other.
- **B** = good. No significant mistakes, well-written, but not distinctive in any way.
- **C** = OK. Some errors, but a basic grasp of the material.
- **D** = poor. Several errors. A tenuous grasp of the material.
- **F** = failing. Problematic on all fronts indicating either no real grasp of the material or a complete lack of effort.

Please note: what counts as “excellent” or “OK,” for example, depends in part upon the nature and level of the class in question.

**Discussion** forms an integral part of the course, and your performance will be graded on the basis of the quantity and quality of your participation. You should arrive prepared to discuss the material and course assignments.

**C. Academic Honesty**

The stiffest punishments possible will be sought for those who plagiarize, fabricate, or cheat. (The usual punishment is an “F” for the course.) The following offers examples of academic dishonesty.

**Plagiarism** Plagiarism is the inclusion of someone else’s product, words, ideas, or data as one’s own work. When a student submits work for credit that includes the product, words, ideas, or data of others, the source must be acknowledged by the use of complete, accurate, and specific references, such as footnotes. Expectations may vary slightly among disciplines. By placing one's name on work submitted for credit, the student certifies the originality of all work not otherwise identified by appropriate acknowledgements. On written assignments, if verbatim statements are included, the statements must be enclosed by quotation marks or set off from regular text as indented extracts. A student will avoid being charged with plagiarism if there is an acknowledgement of indebtedness.

**Indebtedness must be acknowledged whenever:**

1. one quotes another person’s actual words or replicates all or part of another’s product;
2. one uses another person’s ideas, opinions, work, data, or theories, even if they are completely paraphrased in one’s own words;
3. one borrows facts, statistics, or other illustrative materials—unless the information is common knowledge.
Unauthorized collaboration with others on papers or projects can inadvertently lead to a charge of plagiarism.

If in doubt, consult the instructor or seek assistance from the staff of Academic Learning Services (68 PLC, 346-3226). In addition, it is plagiarism to submit as your own any academic exercise (for example, written work, printing, computer program, art or design work, musical composition, and choreography) prepared totally or in part by another.

Plagiarism also includes submitting work in which portions were substantially produced by someone acting as a tutor or editor.

**Fabrication**

Fabrication is the intentional use of information that the author has invented when he or she states or implies otherwise, or the falsification of research or other findings with the intent to deceive.

Examples include, but are not limited to:

1. citing information not taken from the source indicated;
2. listing sources in a reference not used in the academic exercise;
3. inventing data or source information for research or other academic exercises.

**Cheating**

Cheating is an act of deception by which a student misrepresents or misleadingly demonstrates that he or she has mastered information on an academic exercise that he or she has not mastered, including the giving or receiving of unauthorized help in an academic exercise.

Examples include, but are not limited to:

1. copying from another student’s paper, computer program, project, product, or performance;
2. collaborating without authority or allowing another student to copy one’s work in a test situation;
3. resubmitting substantially the same work that was produced for another assignment without the knowledge and permission of the instructor;
4. writing a paper for someone else or permitting someone else to take a test for you.

**E. HOW TO WRITE GOOD PHILOSOPHY PAPERS**

Note: When you get your papers back, there will be comments. The letters in parentheses indicate what aspect of your writing might need improvement and you may see them the second or third time this aspect still needs work.

1. CLARITY (CL) Since this is a philosophy paper, make sure that you define your terms and give reasons for claims. All of your ideas should be explicitly stated and not left to the reader to infer. One difference between philosophy and literature is that philosophers spell everything out, while creative writers depend on the imagination of the reader.

2. PRECISION (P) Try not to make vague claims or general statements about the ideas in the readings. Be accurate in reporting the views of others and exact in stating your own.

3. ORGANIZATION (O) Organize the ideas in the paper into a few coherent paragraphs. Summarize the main claims of your paper in 2 or 3 sentences that you write after you write the paper, but put at the very beginning of the paper. This is an appropriate introductory paragraph for a philosophy paper, not a filler or a fluffy beginning.

4. WRITING MECHANICS (WR) The mechanics include spelling, punctuation, syntax and complete sentence structure. Make sure that you already have these down or consult a source if you don’t. Highly recommended is Strunk and White’s *The Elements of Style*. This is available online at [wwTh.bartleby.com/141/](http://wwwTh.bartleby.com/141/)

4. ANALYSIS (A) Analyze claims. This means breaking your ideas down into their simpler components, and defining the terms. Do not start with or rely on dictionary definitions, but use your own words and cite the dictionary only if necessary. Dictionary definitions report usage, whereas a philosophical definition may be
critical of current usage or find it vague. Examine the logical consequences of your claims and the claims of others.

5. CITATION (C) Cite the required readings this way in your text: (author’s last name, page no.) As well, provide a list of citations at the end of the paper. It is important to do this to show you have done the required reading and are not just recycling notes from class or discussion group lectures. If you do use material from lecture, please make sure to cite that as well.

6. QUOTATIONS (Q) Quotations should be used to illustrate a claim that you are making about an author. They are not a substitute for explaining the author’s thought in your own words. A good strategy is to state the author’s ideas in your own words first and then “prove” your interpretation with a short quote.

7. DIRECT (D) Be direct. Make sure that you give a direct and focused answer to the question for the paper. This is the most important requirement for papers to reach the B and A range.

APPENDIX II. Readings for first class.

DESCARTES

TO

THE VERY SAGE AND ILLUSTRIOS

THE

DEAN AND DOCTORS OF THE SACRED

FACULTY OF THEOLOGY OF PARIS.

GENTLEMEN,

1. The motive which impels me to present this Treatise to you is so reasonable, and, when you shall learn its design, I am confident that you also will consider that there is ground so valid for your taking it under your protection, that I can in no way better recommend it to you than by briefly stating the end which I proposed to myself in it.

2. I have always been of the opinion that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of those that ought to be determined by help of Philosophy rather than of Theology; for although to us, the faithful, it be sufficient to hold as matters of faith, that the human soul does not perish with the body, and that God exists, it yet assuredly seems impossible ever to persuade infidels of the reality of any religion, or almost even any moral virtue, unless, first of all, those two things be proved to them by natural reason. And since in this life there are frequently greater rewards held out to virtue than to vice, few would prefer the right to the useful, if they were restrained neither by the fear of God nor the expectation of another life; and although it is quite true that the existence of God is to be believed since it is taught in the sacred Scriptures, and that, on the other hand, the sacred Scriptures are to be believed because they come from God (for since faith is a gift of God, the same Being who bestows grace to enable us to believe other things, can likewise impart of it to enable us to believe his own existence), nevertheless, this cannot be submitted to infidels, who would consider that the reasoning proceeded in a circle. And, indeed, I have observed that you, with all the other theologians, not only affirmed the sufficiency of natural reason for the proof of the existence of God, but also, that it may be inferred from sacred Scripture, that the knowledge of God is much clearer than of many created things, and that it is really so easy of acquisition as to leave those who do not possess it blameworthy. This is manifest from these words of the Book of Wisdom, chap. xiii., where it is said, Howbeit they are not to be excused; for if their understanding was so great that they could discern the world and the creatures, why did they not rather find out the Lord thereof? And in Romans, chap. i., it is said that
they are without excuse; and again, in the same place, by these words,--That which may be known of 
God is manifest in them-- we seem to be admonished that all which can be known of God may be 
made manifest by reasons obtained from no other source than the inspection of our own minds. I have, 
therefore, thought that it would not be unbecoming in me to inquire how and by what way, without 
going out of ourselves, God may be more easily and certainly known than the things of the 
world.[L][F]

3. And as regards the Soul, although many have judged that its nature could not be easily discovered, 
and some have even ventured to say that human reason led to the conclusion that it perished with 
the body, and that the contrary opinion could be held through faith alone; nevertheless, since the Lateran 
Council, held under Leo X. (in session viii.), condemns these, and expressly enjoins Christian 
philosophers to refute their arguments, and establish the truth according to their ability, I have 
ventured to attempt it in this work.[L][F]

4. Moreover, I am aware that most of the irreligious deny the existence of God, and the distinctness of 
the human soul from the body, for no other reason than because these points, as they allege, have 
never as yet been demonstrated. Now, although I am by no means of their opinion, but, on the 
contrary, hold that almost all the proofs which have been adduced on these questions by great men, 
possess, when rightly understood, the force of demonstrations, and that it is next to impossible to 
discover new, yet there is, I apprehend, no more useful service to be performed in Philosophy, than if 
some one were, once for all, carefully to seek out the best of these reasons, and expound them so 
accurately and clearly that, for the future, it might be manifest to all that they are real demonstrations. 
And finally, since many persons were greatly desirous of this, who knew that I had cultivated a certain 
Method of resolving all kinds of difficulties in the sciences, which is not indeed new (there being 
nothing older than truth), but of which they were aware I had made successful use in other instances, I 
judged it to be my duty to make trial of it also on the present matter.[L][F]

5. Now the sum of what I have been able to accomplish on the subject is contained in this treatise. Not 
that I here essayed to collect all the diverse reasons which might be adduced as proofs on this subject, 
for this does not seem to be necessary, unless on matters where no one proof of adequate certainty is 
to be had; but I treated the first and chief alone in such a manner that I should venture now to propose 
them as demonstrations of the highest certainty and evidence. And I will also add that they are such as 
to lead me to think that there is no way open to the mind of man by which proofs superior to them can 
ever be discovered for the importance of the subject, and the glory of God, to which all this relates, 
constrain me to speak here somewhat more freely of myself than I have been accustomed to do. 
Nevertheless, whatever certitude and evidence I may find in these demonstrations, I cannot therefore 
persuade myself that they are level to the comprehension of all. But just as in geometry there are 
many of the demonstrations of Archimedes, Apollonius, Pappus, and others, which, though received 
by all as highly evident and certain (because indeed they manifestly contain nothing which, 
considered by itself, it is not very easy to understand, and no consequents that are inaccurately related 
to their antecedents), are nevertheless understood by a very limited number, because they are 
somewhat long, and demand the whole attention of the reader: so in the same way, although I consider 
the demonstrations of which I here make use, to be equal or even superior to the geometrical in 
certainty and evidence, I am afraid, nevertheless, that they will not be adequately understood by 
many, as well because they also are somewhat long and involved, as chiefly because they require the 
mind to be entirely free from prejudice, and able with ease to detach itself from the commerce of the 
senses. And, to speak the truth, the ability for metaphysical studies is less general than for those of 
geometry. And, besides, there is still this difference that, as in geometry, all are persuaded that 
nothing is usually advanced of which there is not a certain demonstration, those but partially versed in 
it err more frequently in assenting to what is false, from a desire of seeming to understand it, than in 
denying what is true. In philosophy, on the other hand, where it is believed that all is doubtful, few 
sincerely give themselves to the search after truth, and by far the greater number seek the reputation 
of bold thinkers by audaciously impugning such truths as are of the greatest moment.[L][F]
6. Hence it is that, whatever force my reasonings may possess, yet because they belong to philosophy, I do not expect they will have much effect on the minds of men, unless you extend to them your patronage and approval. But since your Faculty is held in so great esteem by all, and since the name of SORBONNE is of such authority, that not only in matters of faith, but even also in what regards human philosophy, has the judgment of no other society, after the Sacred Councils, received so great deference, it being the universal conviction that it is impossible elsewhere to find greater perspicacity and solidity, or greater wisdom and integrity in giving judgment, I doubt not,—if you but condescend to pay so much regard to this Treatise as to be willing, in the first place, to correct it (for, mindful not only of my humanity, but chiefly also of my ignorance, I do not affirm that it is free from errors); in the second place, to supply what is wanting in it, to perfect what is incomplete, and to give more ample illustration where it is demanded, or at least to indicate these defects to myself that I may endeavour to remedy them; and, finally, when the reasonings contained in it, by which the existence of God and the distinction of the human soul from the body are established, shall have been brought to such degree of perspicuity as to be esteemed exact demonstrations, of which I am assured they admit, if you condescend to accord them the authority of your approbation, and render a public testimony of their truth and certainty,—I doubt not, I say, but that henceforward all the errors which have ever been entertained on these questions will very soon be effaced from the minds of men. For truth itself will readily lead the remainder of the ingenious and the learned to subscribe to your judgment; and your authority will cause the atheists, who are in general sciolists rather than ingenious or learned, to lay aside the spirit of contradiction, and lead them, perhaps, to do battle in their own persons for reasonings which they find considered demonstrations by all men of genius, lest they should seem not to understand them; and, finally, the rest of mankind will readily trust to so many testimonies, and there will no longer be any one who will venture to doubt either the existence of God or the real distinction of mind and body. It is for you, in your singular wisdom, to judge of the importance of the establishment of such beliefs, [who are cognisant of the disorders which doubt of these truths produces]. But it would not here become me to commend at greater length the cause of God and of religion to you, who have always proved the strongest support of the Catholic Church.

PREFACE TO THE READER.

1. I have already slightly touched upon the questions respecting the existence of God and the nature of the human soul, in the "Discourse on the Method of rightly conducting the Reason, and seeking Truth in the Sciences," published in French in the year 1637; not however, with the design of there treating of them fully, but only, as it were, in passing, that I might learn from the judgment of my readers in what way I should afterward handle them; for these questions appeared to me to be of such moment as to be worthy of being considered more than once, and the path which I follow in discussing them is so little trodden, and so remote from the ordinary route that I thought it would not be expedient to illustrate it at greater length in French, and in a discourse that might be read by all, lest even the more feeble minds should believe that this path might be entered upon by the

2. But, as in the "Discourse on Method," I had requested all who might find aught meritng censure in my writings, to do me the favor of pointing it out to me, I may state that no objections worthy of remark have been alleged against what I then said on these questions except two, to which I will here briefly reply, before undertaking their more detailed discussion.

3. The first objection is that though, while the human mind reflects on itself, it does not perceive that it is any other than a thinking thing, it does not follow that its nature or essence consists only in its being a thing which thinks; so that the word ONLY shall exclude all other things which might also perhaps be said to pertain to the nature of the mind. To this objection I reply, that it was not my intention in that place to exclude these according to the order of truth in the matter (of which I did not then treat),* only according to the order of thought (perception); so that my meaning was, that I clearly apprehended nothing, so far as I was conscious, as belonging to my essence, except that I was a thinking thing, or a thing possessing in itself the faculty of thinking. But I will show hereafter how,
from the consciousness that nothing besides thinking belongs to the essence of the mind, it follows
that nothing else does in truth belong to it.[L]

4. The second objection is that it does not follow, from my possessing the idea of a thing more perfect
than I am, that the idea itself is more perfect than myself, and much less that what is represented by
the idea exists. But I reply that in the term idea there is here something equivocal; for it may be taken
either materially for an act of the understanding, and in this sense it cannot be said to be more perfect
than I, or objectively, for the thing represented by that act, which, although it be not supposed to exist
out of my understanding, may, nevertheless, be more perfect than myself, by reason of its essence.
But, in the sequel of this treatise I will show more amply how, from my possessing the idea of a thing
more perfect than myself, it follows that this thing really exists.[L]

5. Besides these two objections, I have seen, indeed, two treatises of sufficient length relating to the
present matter. In these, however, my conclusions, much more than my premises, were impugned, and
that by arguments borrowed from the common places of the atheists. But, as arguments of this sort
can make no impression on the minds of those who shall rightly understand my reasonings, and as the
judgments of many are so irrational and weak that they are persuaded rather by the opinions on a
subject that are first presented to them, however false and opposed to reason they may be, than by a
true and solid, but subsequently received, refutation of them, I am unwilling here to reply to these
strictures from a dread of being, in the first instance, obliged to state theTU. I will only say, in
general, that all which the atheists commonly allege in favor of the non-existence of God, arises
continually from one or other of these two things, namely, either the ascription of human affections to
Deity, or the undue attribution to our minds of so much vigor and wisdom that we may essay to
determine and comprehend both what God can and ought to do; hence all that is alleged by them will
occasion us no difficulty, provided only we keep in remembrance that our minds must be considered
finite, while Deity is incomprehensible and infinite.[L]

6. Now that I have once, in some measure, made proof of the opinions of men regarding my work, I
again undertake to treat of God and the human soul, and at the same time to discuss the principles of
the entire First Philosophy, without, however, expecting any commendation from the crowd for my
endeavors, or a wide circle of readers. On the contrary, I would advise none to read this work, unless
such as are able and willing to meditate with me in earnest, to detach their minds from commerce with
the senses, and likewise to deliver themselves from all prejudice; and individuals of this character are,
I welt Hew, remarkably rare. But with regard to those who, without caring to comprehend the order
and connection of the reasonings, shall study only detached clauses for the purpose of small but noisy
criticism, as is the custom with many, I may say that such persons will not profit greatly by the
reading of this treatise; and although perhaps they may find opportunity for cavilling in several places,
they will yet hardly start any pressing objections, or such as shall be deserving of reply.[L]

7. But since, indeed, I do not promise to satisfy others on all these subjects at first sight, nor arrogate
so much to myself as to believe that I have been able to forsee all that may be the source of difficulty
to each ones I shall expound, first of all, in the Meditations, those considerations by which I feel
persuaded that I have arrived at a certain and evident knowledge of truth, in order that I may ascertain
whether the reasonings which have prevailed with myself will also be effectual in convincing others. I
will then reply to the objections of some men, illustrious for their genius and learning, to whom these
Meditations were sent for criticism before they were committed to the press; for these objections are
so numerous and varied that I venture to anticipate that nothing, at least nothing of any moment, will
readily occur to any mind which has not been touched upon in theTU. Hence it is that I earnestly
entreat my readers not to come to any judgment on the questions raised in the Meditations until they
have taken care to read the whole of the Objections, with the relative Replies.

1690
AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
by John Locke
TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
LORD THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE AND MONTGOMERY,
BARRON HERBERT OF CARDIFF,
LORD ROSS, OF KENDAL, PAR, FITZHUGH, MARMION, ST. QUINTIN,
AND SHURLAND; LORD PRESIDENT OF HIS MAJESTY’S MOST
HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL; AND LORD LIEUTENANT OF
THE COUNTY OF WILTS, AND OF SOUTH WALES.

MY LORD,

--THIS Treatise, which is grown up under your lordship’s eye, and has ventured into the world by
your order, does now, by a natural kind of right, come to your lordship for that protection which you
several years since promised it. It is not that I think any name, how great soever, set at the beginning
of a book, will be able to cover the faults that are to be found in it. Things in print must stand and fall
by their own worth, or the reader’s fancy. But there being nothing more to be desired for truth than a
fair unprejudiced hearing, nobody is more likely to procure me that than your lordship, who are
allowed to have got so intimate an acquaintance with her, in her more retired recesses. Your lordship
is known to have so far advanced your speculations in the most abstract and general knowledge of
things, beyond the ordinary reach or common methods, that your allowance and approbation of the
design of this Treatise will at least preserve it from being condemned without reading, and will prevail
to have those parts a little weighted, which might otherwise perhaps be thought to deserve no
consideration, for being somewhat out of the common road. The imputation of Novelty is a terrible
charge amongst those who judge of men’s heads, as they do of their perukes, by the fashion, and can
allow none to be right but the received doctrines. Truth scarce ever yet carried it by vote anywhere at
its first appearance: new opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed, without any other
reason but because they are not already common. But truth, like gold, is not the less so for being
newly brought out of the mine. It is trial and examination must give it price, and not any antique
fashion; and though it be not yet current by the public stamp, yet it may, for all that, be as old as
nature, and is certainly not the less genuine. Your lordship can give great and convincing instances of
this, whenever you please to oblige the public with some of those large and comprehensive
discoveries you have made of truths hitherto unknown, unless to some few, from whom your lordship
has been pleased not wholly to conceal theTU. This alone were a sufficient reason, were there no
other, why I should dedicate this Essay to your lordship; and its having some little correspondence
with some parts of that nobler and vast system of the sciences your lordship has made so new, exact,
and instructive draught of, I think it glory enough, if your lordship permit me to boast, that here and
there I have fallen into some thoughts not wholly different from yours. If your lordship think fit that,
by your encouragement, this should appear in the world, I hope it may be a reason, some time or
other, to lead your lordship further; and you will allow me to say, that you here give the world an
earnest of something that, if they can bear with this, will be truly worth their ex

This, my lord, shows what a present I here make to your lordship; just such as the poor man does to his rich and
great neighbour, by whom the basket of flowers or fruit is not ill taken, though he has more plenty of
his own growth, and in much greater perfection. Worthless things receive a value when they are made
the offerings of respect, esteem, and gratitude: these you have given me so mighty and peculiar
reasons to have, in the highest degree, for your lordship, that if they can add a price to what they go
along with, proportionable to their own greatness, I can with confidence brag, I here make your
lordship the richest present you ever received. This I am sure, I am under the greatest obligations to
seek all occasions to acknowledge a long train of favours I have received from your lordship; favours,
though great and important in themselves, yet made much more so by the forwardness, concern, and
kindness, and other obliging circumstances, that never failed to accompany theTU. To all this you are
pleased to add that which gives yet more weight and relish to all the rest: you vouchsafe to continue
me in some degrees of your esteem, and allow me a place in your good thoughts, I had almost said
friendship. This, my lord, your words and actions so constantly show on all occasions, even to others
when I am absent, that it is not vanity in me to mention what everybody knows: but it would be want
of good manners not to acknowledge what so many are witnesses of, and every day tell me I am
indebted to your lordship for. I wish they could as easily assist my gratitude, as they convince me of the great and growing engagements it has to your lordship. This I am sure, I should write of the Understanding without having any, if I were not extremely sensible of them, and did not lay hold on this opportunity to testify to the world how much I am obliged to be, and how much I am,

MY LORD,

--Your Lordship's most humble and most obedient servant,

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JOHN LOCKE

-Dorset Court,
-24th of May, 1689

EPISTLE TO THE READER

--I HAVE put into thy hands what has been the diversion of some of my idle and heavy hours. If it has the good luck to prove so of any of thine, and thou hast but half so much pleasure in reading as I had in writing it, thou wilt as little think thy money, as I do my pains, ill bestowed. Mistake not this for a commendation of my work; nor conclude, because I was pleased with the doing of it, that therefore I am fondly taken with it now it is done. He that hawks at larks and sparrows has no less sport, though a much less considerable quarry, than he that flies at nobler game: and he is little acquainted with the subject of this treatise - the UNDERSTANDING - who does not know that, as it is the most elevated faculty of the soul, so it is employed with a greater and more constant delight than any of the other. Its searches after truth are a sort of hawking and hunting, wherein the very pursuit makes a great part of the pleasure. Every step the mind takes in its progress towards Knowledge makes some discovery, which is not only new, but the best too, for the time at least.

--For the understanding, like the eye, judging of objects only by its own sight, cannot but be pleased with what it discovers, having less regret for what has escaped it, because it is unknown. Thus he who has raised himself above the alms-basket, and, not content to live lazily on scraps of begged opinions, sets his own thoughts on work, to find and follow truth, will (whatever he lights on) not miss the hunter's satisfaction; every moment of his pursuit will reward his pains with some delight; and he will have reason to think his time not ill spent, even when he cannot much boast of any great acquisition. This, Reader, is the entertainment of those who let loose their own thoughts, and follow them in writing; which thou oughtest not to envy them, since they afford thee an opportunity of the like diversion, if thou wilt make use of thy own thoughts in reading. It is to them, if they are thy own, that I refer myself: but if they are taken upon trust from others, it is no great matter what they are; they are not following truth, but some meaner consideration; and it is not worth while to be concerned what he says or thinks, who says or thinks only as he is directed by another. If thou judgest for thyself I know thou wilt judge candidly, and then I shall not be harmed or offended, whatever be thy censure. For though it be certain that there is nothing in this Treatise of the truth whereof I am not fully persuaded, yet I consider myself as liable to mistakes as I can think thee, and know that this book must stand or fall with thee, not by any opinion I have of it, but thy own. If thou findest little in it new or instructive to thee, thou art not to blame me for it. It was not meant for those that had already mastered this subject, and made a thorough acquaintance with their own understandings; but for my own information, and the satisfaction of a few friends, who acknowledged themselves not to have sufficiently considered it.
Were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this Essay, I should tell thee, that five or six friends meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had awhile puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed that this should be our first inquiry. Some hasty and undigested thoughts, on a subject I had never before considered, which I set down against our next meeting, gave the first entrance into this Discourse; which having been thus begun by chance, was continued by intreaty; written by incoherent parcels; and after long intervals of neglect, resumed again, as my humour or occasions permitted; and at last, in a retirement where an attendance on my health gave me leisure, it was brought into that order thou now seest it.

This discontinued way of writing may have occasioned, besides others, two contrary faults, viz., that too little and too much may be said in it. If thou findest anything wanting, I shall be glad that what I have written gives thee any desire that I should have gone further. If it seems too much to thee, thou must blame the subject; for when I put pen to paper, I thought all I should have to say on this matter would have been contained in one sheet of paper; but the further I went the larger prospect I had; new discoveries led me still on, and so it grew insensibly to the bulk it now appears in. I will not deny, but possibly it might be reduced to a narrower compass than it is, and that some parts of it might be contracted, the way it has been writ in, by catches, and many long intervals of interruption, being apt to cause some repetitions. But to confess the truth, I am now too lazy, or too busy, to make it shorter.

I am not ignorant how little I herein consult my own reputation, when I knowingly let it go with a fault, so apt to disgust the most judicious, who are always the nicest readers. But they who know sloth is apt to content itself with any excuse, will pardon me if mine has prevailed on me, where I think I have a very good one. I will not therefore allege in my defence, that the same notion, having different respects, may be convenient or necessary to prove or illustrate several parts of the same discourse, and that so it has happened in many parts of this: but waiving that, I shall frankly avow that I have sometimes dwelt long upon the same argument, and expressed it different ways, with a quite different design. I pretend not to publish this Essay for the information of men of large thoughts and quick apprehensions; to such masters of knowledge I profess myself a scholar, and therefore warn them beforehand not to expect anything here, but what, being spun out of my own coarse thoughts, is fitted to men of my own size, to whom, perhaps, it will not be unacceptable that I have taken some pains to make plain and familiar to their thoughts some truths which established prejudice, or the abstractedness of the ideas themselves, might render difficult. Some objects had need be turned on every side; and when the notion is new, as I confess some of these are to me; or out of the ordinary road, as I suspect they will appear to others, it is not one simple view of it that will gain it admittance into every understanding, or fix it there with a clear and lasting impression. There are few, I believe, who have not observed in themselves or others, that what in one way of proposing was very obscure, another way of expressing it has made very clear and intelligible; though afterwards the mind found little difference in the phrases, and wondered why one failed to be understood more than the other. But everything does not hit alike upon every man's imagination. We have our understandings no less different than our palates; and he that thinks the same truth shall be equally relished by every one in the same dress, may as well hope to feast every one with the same sort of cookery: the meat may be the same, and the nourishment good, yet every one not be able to receive it with that seasoning; and it must be dressed another way, if you will have it go down with some, even of strong constitutions. The truth is, those who advised me to publish it, advised me, for this reason, to publish it as it is: and since I have been brought to let it go abroad, I desire it should be understood by whoever gives himself the pains to read it. I have so little affection to be in print, that if I were not flattered this Essay might be of some use to others, as I think it has been to me, I should have confined it to the view of some friends, who gave the first occasion to it. My appearing therefore in print being on purpose to be as useful as I may, I think it necessary to make what I have to say as easy and intelligible to all sorts of
readers as I can. And I had much rather the speculative and quick-sighted should complain of my being in some parts tedious, than that any one, not accustomed to abstract speculations, or prepossessed with different notions, should mistake or not comprehend my meaning.

--It will possibly be censured as a great piece of vanity or insolence in me, to pretend to instruct this our knowing age; it amounting to little less, when I own, that I publish this Essay with hopes it may be useful to others. But, if it may be permitted to speak freely of those who with a feigned modesty condemn as useless what they themselves write, methinks it savours much more of vanity or insolence to publish a book for any other end; and he fails very much of that respect he owes the public, who prints, and consequently expects men should read, that wherein he intends not they should meet with anything of use to themselves or others: and should nothing else be found allowable in this Treatise, yet my design will not cease to be so; and the goodness of my intention ought to be some excuse for the worthlessness of my present. It is that chiefly which secures me from the fear of censure, which I expect not to escape more than better writers. Men's principles, notions, and relishes are so different, that it is hard to find a book which pleases or displeases all men. I acknowledge the age we live in is not the least knowing, and therefore not the most easy to be satisfied. If I have not the good luck to please, yet nobody ought to be offended with me. I plainly tell all my readers, except half a dozen, this Treatise was not at first intended for them; and therefore they need not be at the trouble to be of that number. But yet if any one thinks fit to be angry and rail at it, he may do it securely, for I shall find some better way of spending my time than in such kind of conversation. I shall always have the satisfaction to have aimed sincerely at truth and usefulness, though in one of the meanest ways. The commonwealth of learning is not at this time without master-builders, whose mighty designs, in advancing the sciences, will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity: but every one must not hope to be a Boyle or a Sydenham; and in an age that produces such masters as the great Huygenius and the incomparable Mr. Newton, with some others of that strain, it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge; which certainly had been very much more advanced in the world, if the endeavours of ingenious and industrious men had not been much cumbered with the learned but frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible terms, introduced into the sciences, and there made an art of, to that degree that Philosophy, which is nothing but the true knowledge of things, was thought unfit or incapable to be brought into well-bred company and polite conversation. Vague and insignificant forms of speech, and abuse of language, have so long passed for mysteries of science; and hard and misapplied words, with little or no meaning, have, by prescription, such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade either those who speak or those who hear them, that they are but the covers of ignorance, and hindrance of true knowledge. To break in upon the sanctuary of vanity and ignorance will be, I suppose, some service to human understanding; though so few are apt to think they deceive or are deceived in the use of words; or that the language of the sect they are of has any faults in it which ought to be examined or corrected, that I hope I shall be pardoned if I have in the Third Book dwelt long on this subject, and endeavoured to make it so plain, that neither the inveterateness of the mischief, nor the prevalency of the fashion, shall be any excuse for those who will not take care about the meaning of their own words, and will not suffer the significance of their expressions to be inquired into.

--I have been told that a short Epitome of this Treatise, which was printed in 1688, was by some condemned without reading, because innate ideas were denied in it; they too hastily concluding, that if innate ideas were not supposed, there would be little left either of the notion or proof of spirits. If any one take the like offence at the entrance of this Treatise, I shall desire him to read it through; and then I hope he will be convinced, that the taking away false foundations is not to the prejudice but advantage of truth, which is never injured or endangered so much as when mixed with, or built on, falsehood.

--In the Second Edition I added as followeth:
The bookseller will not forgive me if I say nothing of this New Edition, which he has promised, by the correctness of it, shall make amends for the many faults committed in the former. He desires too, that it should be known that it has one whole new chapter concerning Identity, and many additions and amendments in other places. These I must inform my reader are not all new matter, but most of them either further confirmation of what I had said, or explications, to prevent others being mistaken in the sense of what was formerly printed, and not any variation in me from it.

--I must only except the alterations I have made in Book II. chap. xxi.

--What I had there written concerning Liberty and the Will, I thought deserved as accurate a view as I am capable of; those subjects having in all ages exercised the learned part of the world with questions and difficulties, that have not a little perplexed morality and divinity, those parts of knowledge that men are most concerned to be clear in. Upon a closer inspection into the working of men's minds, and a stricter examination of those motives and views they are turned by, I have found reason somewhat to alter the thoughts I formerly had concerning that which gives the last determination to the Will in all voluntary actions. This I cannot forbear to acknowledge to the world with as much freedom and readiness as I at first published what then seemed to me to be right; thinking myself more concerned to quit and renounce any opinion of my own, than oppose that of another, when truth appears against it. For it is truth alone seek, and that will always be welcome to me, when or from whencesoever it comes.

--But what forwardness soever I have to resign any opinion I have, or to recede from anything I have writ, upon the first evidence of any error in it; yet this I must own, that I have not had the good luck to receive any light from those exceptions I have met with in print against any part of my book, nor have, from anything that has been urged against it, found reason to alter my sense in any of the points that have been questioned. Whether the subject I have in hand requires often more thought and attention than cursory readers, at least such as are prepossessed, are willing to allow; or whether any obscurity in my expressions casts a cloud over it, and these notions are made difficult to others' apprehensions in my way of treating them; so it is, that my meaning, I find, is often mistaken, and I have not the good luck to be everywhere rightly understood.

--Of this the ingenious author of the Discourse Concerning the Nature of Man has given me a late instance, to mention no other. For the civility of his expressions, and the candour that belongs to his order, forbid me to think that he would have closed his Preface with an insinuation, as if in what I had said, Book II. ch. xxvii, concerning the third rule which men refer their actions to, I went about to make virtue vice and vice virtue unless he had mistaken my meaning; which he could not have done if he had given himself the trouble to consider what the argument was I was then upon, and what was the chief design of that chapter, plainly enough set down in the fourth section and those following. For I was there not laying down moral rules, but showing the original and nature of moral ideas, and enumerating the rules men make use of in moral relations, whether these rules were true or false: and pursuant thereto I tell what is everywhere called virtue and vice; which "alters not the nature of things," though men generally do judge of and denominate their actions according to the esteem and fashion of the place and sect they are of.

--If he had been at the pains to reflect on what I had said, Bk. I. ch. ii. sect. 18, and Bk. II. ch. xxviii. sects. 13, 14, 15 and 20, he would have known what I think of the eternal and unalterable nature of right and wrong, and what I call virtue and vice. And if he had observed that in the place he quotes I only report as a matter of fact what others call virtue and vice, he would not have found it liable to any great exception. For I think I am not much out in saying that one of the rules made use of in the world for a ground or measure of a moral relation is- that esteem and reputation which several sorts of actions find variously in the several societies of men, according to which they are there called virtues or vices. And whatever authority the learned Mr. Lowde places in his Old English Dictionary, I daresay it nowhere tells him (if I should appeal to it) that the same action is not in credit, called and counted a virtue, in one place, which, being in disrepute, passes for and under the name of vice in
another. The taking notice that men bestow the names of "virtue" and "vice" according to this rule of
Reputation is all I have done, or can be laid to my charge to have done, towards the making vice
virtue or virtue vice. But the good man does well, and as becomes his calling, to be watchful in such
points, and to take the alarm even at expressions, which, standing alone by themselves, might sound
ill and be suspected.

--Tis to this zeal, allowable in his function, that I forgive his citing as he does these words of mine
(ch. xxviii. sect. II): "Even the exhortations of inspired teachers have not feared to appeal to common
repute, Philip. iv. 8"; without taking notice of those immediately preceding, which introduce them,
and run thus: "Whereby even in the corruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of nature,
which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice, were pretty well preserved. So that even the exhortations
of inspired teachers," &c. By which words, and the rest of that section, it is plain that I brought that
passage of St. Paul, not to prove that the general measure of what men called virtue and vice
throughout the world was, the reputation and fashion of each particular society within itself; but to
show that, though it were so, yet, for reasons I there give, men, in that way of denominating their
actions, did not for the most part much stray from the Law of Nature; which is that standing and
unalterable rule by which they ought to judge of the moral rectitude and gravity of their actions, and
accordingly denominate them virtues or vices. Had Mr. Lowde considered this, he would have found
it little to his purpose to have quoted this passage in a sense I used it not; and would I imagine have
spared the application he subjoins to it, as not very necessary. But I hope this Second Edition will give
him satisfaction on the point, and that this matter is now so expressed as to show him there was no
cause for scruple.

--Though I am forced to differ from him in these apprehensions he has expressed, in the latter end of
his preface, concerning what I had said about virtue and vice, yet we are better agreed than he thinks
in what he says in his third chapter (p. 78) concerning "natural inscription and innate notions." I shall
not deny him the privilege he claims (p. 52), to state the question as he pleases, especially when he
states it so as to leave nothing in it contrary to what I have said. For, according to him, "innate
notions, being conditional things, depending upon the concurrence of several other circumstances in
order to the soul's exerting them," all that he says for "innate, imprinted, impressed notions" (for of
innate ideas he says nothing at all), amounts at last only to this- that there are certain propositions
which, though the soul from the beginning, or when a man is born, does not know, yet "by assistance
from the outward senses, and the help of some previous cultivation," it may afterwards come certainly
to know the truth of; which is no more than what I have affirmed in my First Book. For I suppose by
the "soul's exerting them," he means its beginning to know them; or else the soul's "exerting of
notions" will be to me a very unintelligible expression; and I think at best is a very unfit one in this, it
misleading men's thoughts by an insinuation, as if these notions were in the mind before the "soul
exerts them," i.e. before they are known; whereas truly before they are known, there is nothing of
them in the mind but a capacity to know them, when the "concurrence of those circumstances," which
this ingenious author thinks necessary "in order to the soul's exerting them," brings them into our
knowledge.

--P. 52 I find him express it thus: "These natural notions are not so imprinted upon the soul as that
they naturally and necessarily exert themselves (even in children and idiots) without any assistance
from the outward senses, or without the help of some previous cultivation." Here, he says, they exert
themselves, as p. 78, that the "soul exerts theTU." When he has explained to himself or others what he
means by "the soul's exerting innate notions," or their "exerting themselves"; and what that "previous
cultivation and circumstances" in order to their being exerted are- he will I suppose find there is so
little of controversy between him and me on the point, bating that he calls that "exerting of notions"
which I in a more vulgar style call "knowing," that I have reason to think he brought in my name on
this occasion only out of the pleasure he has to speak civilly of me; which I must gratefully
acknowledge he has done everywhere he mentions me, not without conferring on me, as some others
have done, a title I have no right to.
There are so many instances of this, that I think it justice to my reader and myself to conclude, that either my book is plainly enough written to be rightly understood by those who peruse it with that attention and indifferency, which every one who will give himself the pains to read ought to employ in reading; or else that I have written mine so obscurely that it is in vain to go about to mend it. Whichever of these be the truth, it is myself only am affected thereby; and therefore I shall be far from troubling my reader with what I think might be said in answer to those several objections I have met with, to passages here and there of my book; since I persuade myself that he who thinks them of moment enough to be concerned whether they are true or false, will be able to see that what is said is either not well founded, or else not contrary to my doctrine, when I and my opposer come both to be well understood.

If any other authors, careful that none of their good thoughts should be lost, have published their censures of my Essay, with this honour done to it, that they will not suffer it to be an essay, I leave it to the public to value the obligation they have to their critical pens, and shall not waste my reader's time in so idle or ill-natured an employment of mine, as to lessen the satisfaction any one has in himself, or gives to others, in so hasty a confutation of what I have written.

The booksellers preparing for the Fourth Edition of my Essay, gave me notice of it, that I might, if I had leisure, make any additions or alterations I should think fit. Whereupon I thought it convenient to advertise the reader, that besides several corrections I had made here and there, there was one alteration which it was necessary to mention, because it ran through the whole book, and is of consequence to be rightly understood. What I thereupon said was this:-

Clear and distinct ideas are terms which, though familiar and frequent in men's mouths, I have reason to think every one who uses does not perfectly understand. And possibly 'tis but here and there one who gives himself the trouble to consider them so far as to know what he himself or others precisely mean by theTU. I have therefore in most places chose to put determinate or determined, instead of clear and distinct, as more likely to direct men's thoughts to my meaning in this matter. By those denominations, I mean some object in the mind, and consequently determined, i.e. such as it is there seen and perceived to be. This, I think, may fitly be called a determinate or determined idea, when such as it is at any time objectively in the mind, and so determined there, it is annexed, and without variation determined, to a name or articulate sound, which is to be steadily the sign of that very same object of the mind, or determinate idea.

To explain this a little more particularly. By determinate, when applied to a simple idea, I mean that simple appearance which the mind has in its view, or perceives in itself, when that idea is said to be in it: by determined, when applied to a complex idea, I mean such an one as consists of a determinate number of certain simple or less complex ideas, joined in such a proportion and situation as the mind has before its view, and sees in itself, when that idea is present in it, or should be present in it, when a man gives a name to it. I say should be, because it is not every one, nor perhaps any one, who is so careful of his language as to use no word till he views in his mind the precise determined idea which he resolves to make it the sign of The want of this is the cause of no small obscurity and confusion in men's thoughts and discourses.

I know there are not words enough in any language to answer all the variety of ideas that enter into men's discourses and reasonings. But this hinders not but that when any one uses any term, he may have in his mind a determined idea, which he makes it the sign of, and to which he should keep it steadily annexed during that present discourse. Where he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear or distinct ideas: it is plain his are not so; and therefore there can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion, where such terms are made use of which have not such a precise determination.

Upon this ground I have thought determined ideas a way of speaking less liable to mistakes, than clear and distinct: and where men have got such determined ideas of all that they reason, inquire, or
argue about, they will find a great part of their doubts and disputes at an end; the greatest part of the questions and controversies that perplex mankind depending on the doubtful and uncertain use of words, or (which is the same) indetermined ideas, which they are made to stand for. I have made choice of these terms to signify, (1) Some immediate object of the mind, which it perceives and has before it, distinct from the sound it uses as a sign of it. (2) That this idea, thus determined, i.e. which the mind has in itself, and knows, and sees there, be determined without any change to that name, and that name determined to that precise idea. If men had such determined ideas in their inquiries and discourses, they would both discern how far their own inquiries and discourses went, and avoid the greatest part of the disputes and wranglings they have with others.

--Besides this, the bookseller will think it necessary I should advertise the reader that there is an addition of two chapters wholly new; the one of the Association of Ideas, the other of EnthusiasTU. These, with some other larger additions never before printed, he has engaged to print by themselves, after the same manner, and for the same purpose, as was done when this Essay had the second impression.

--In the Sixth Edition there is very little added or altered. The greatest part of what is new is contained in the twenty-first chapter of the second book, which any one, if he thinks it worth while, may, with a very little labour, transcribe into the margin of the former edition.